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Abstract
Using information-theoretic constructions, it is possible to characterise the
security of a communication system. This is called physical layer security.
The intrinsic randomness of the wireless channel allows for provable security
guarantees in the presence of an eavesdropper.
As telecommunications requirements and technologies evolve, questions
about point to point systems are re-framed in ways which have not yet been
explored. In this thesis we analyse the robustness of particular future wireless
technologies against eavesdropping at the physical layer.
In the first of the original research chapters the secrecy capacity of a
Gaussian multiple antenna system is considered. Despite the importance of
the secrecy capacity metric, the general solution remains an open problem.
This thesis resolves the secrecy capacity to be concave in a particular region in
the single antenna eavesdropper regime. This allows for efficient computation
of the secrecy capacity and gives communication rates which are secure.
In the second research chapter, we analyse a multiple antenna, multiple
access scheme. We show that the system is inherently secure, since the eaves-
droppers signal-to-noise ratio decreases with the number of users, amongst
other results.
The third research chapter introduces a novel channel coding scheme,
combining constant weight arithmetic coding with an existing combinatorial
scheme. The codewords are designed to be low-power and robust against time
dispersion. This has the advantage that several users may broadcast messages
simultaneously. The codebook design uses characteristics of the legitimate
channel, which the eavesdropper does not have access to. Simulation results
show that the eavesdropper has a low probability of success.
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Notation
• Upper case letters denote random variables, such as X.
• Vectors will be denoted as bold lower case symbols, such as x.
• Entries of vectors are denoted xi.
• Matrices are denoted by upper case letters, such as H.
• Hi,j denotes the (i, j)th entry of a matrix H.
• It will be clear from context whether an upper case letter denotes a
matrix or a variable.
• Conjugate transposes of matrices are denoted with a ∗, such as H∗
• All logarithms are to the base 2 unless stated otherwise.






Communication security is traditionally provided by methods such as shared
secret keys. Such techniques take place in the upper layers of the Open
Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model [76] (Table 1), a standardised
model for telecommunications technologies, where each layer is independent
of one another and deals with different types of data. The work in this thesis
focuses on the physical layer, which is the layer concerning data at bit level.








Table 1: The seven layers of the OSI reference model.
A layered architecture such as the OSI model means that it is possible to
have security measures at each of the seven layers, which for something as
crucial as data security, is surely desirable. The physical layer, the only layer
which deals with data at bit level, is ‘layer 1’ and typically concerns matters
of reliability and the physical medium for the transmission, such as the type
of wire or frequency. In most modern day cases this medium will be wireless.
The physical layer historically has not been used for security nearly as much
as other, higher, layers where the security protocols assume that the physical
layer is error free [7].
Classical security techniques have assumptions behind them which mod-
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ern advances are surpassing. A cryptographic measure is considered secure
if it would take an unfeasible amount of computational power for an adver-
sary to break it [69]. Computational power available is increasing and thus
this assumption may not hold in a modern day scenario. What is considered
unfeasible depends on the current state of the art and is constantly changing.
All of this illustrates the desire to move away from a sole reliance on these
classical techniques. The stack based model which most devices are based
upon allows for security to be implemented at multiple layers. Therefore
these technologies may be used in parallel and complement one another where
feasible.
Fewer than 10% of the population used 1G [20] but developments in
telecommunications has led to reduced costs for these technologies and a far
greater uptake than could have been predicted in the days of Shannon. As
5G becomes a reality and 6G is being developed [74], much of the theory
underlying physical layer security remains unknown. Although the funda-
mental ideas date back to Shannon in 1949 [68] and Wyner in 1975 [73],
their work is based on classical point-to-point communication systems, and
new versions of these results are required for multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) and massive MIMO systems.
Physical layer security has an information-theoretic foundation and does
not rely on the computing power available to the users, overcoming the con-
cerns outlined above. It is instead based on the quality of the channel between
the users and the blocklength of the messages. Rather than requiring users to
generate random secret keys, physical layer security utilises the inherent ran-
domness of the physical medium (in a wireless channel, this could be due to
random electrical pulses in the environment) in order to improve secrecy. As
long as the legitimate users maintain some advantage over the eavesdropper,
their rate of perfectly secure communications may be positive.
This thesis studies security from the perspective of passive eavesdrop-
2
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ping attacks. That is where the adversary does not actively jam, spoof or
contaminate the legitimate signal, but simply overhears. Robustness against
passive eavesdropping protects users against unwanted interception and traf-
fic analysis. In this setup a legitimate user, Alice, is sending a message to
a legitimate receiver, Bob. This message is intercepted by an eavesdropper,
Eve, who observes the transmitted message through a different channel to
Bob. The difference in their channel is utilised to provide secrecy.
Alice Bob
Eve
Motivated by the evolution of telecommunications and security require-
ments, this thesis aims to address open problems and consider the inherent
security of advancing technologies.
Chapter 1 provides the mathematical background required for this the-
sis. Chapter 2 introduces the communications systems with the associated
definitions and results required. Chapter 3 surveys the literature in the rel-
evant areas of physical layer security. Chapter 4 states and proves results
about the concavity of the MIMO secrecy capacity, the theoretical maximum
rate for error free, perfectly secure communications for the Gaussian channel
in the case of a single eavesdrop antenna, contributing to the literature for
this open problem. Chapter 5 considers a downlink MIMO NOMA setup
and shows its robustness to eavesdropping. Using results from random matrix
theory, it is shown that the secrecy is enhanced as the number of antennas in-
creases. Chapter 6 introduces a novel combinatorial coding scheme, which
provides security against a passive eavesdropper while allowing several users
to communicate in a time dispersive environment. The scheme uses prop-
erties of the legitimate channel to generate a sparse codebook, making the
scheme robust to eavesdroppers who do not have access to these channels.
Chapter 7 summarises the key contributions of the preceding chapters and
3
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In this chapter we outline some of the mathematical preliminaries required for
analysing communication systems in later chapters. We begin by introducing
the mathematical framework for communication systems and coding rates,
information theory.
1.1 Information theory: an introduction
Information theory is the mathematical study of communications systems.
The field was founded by Claude Shannon in the paper ‘A Mathematical
Theory of Communication’ [67], information theory concerns transmitting
messages where noise is present.
1.1.1 Measuring uncertainty
A key metric in information theory is the entropy, which measures the uncer-
tainty of a variable, or the surprise associated with an outcome of a random
event. An event with high probability will have a low information content, as
it has less of a ‘surprise’ factor, whereas an unlikely event occurring carries
more information. For example if we see that it is raining in Bristol, a typ-
ically rainy city, this is not so surprising. The event has a high probability
and thus low information value. If it is raining in the Atacama Desert, this
is more surprising as it has a low probability and thus a high information
value. Shannon quantified information of an event with probability p to be
− log(p), and the entropy is the expected information content.
5
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Definition 1.1.1: The entropy of a discrete random variable X, taking val-




p(x) log p(x), (1.1)
where we let 0 log 0 = 0.
When the logarithm is base 2, entropy is measured in bits.
Example 1.1.2: Consider a Bernoulli distribution with probability of suc-
cess p and probability of failure 1− p. The entropy may be written as
H(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p), (1.2)
also known as the binary entropy function. If p = 1 or p = 0 then the entropy
is zero. This is because there is no surprise as the variable is deterministic.
The entropy of a Bernoulli random variable can be seen in Figure 1.1. It is
maximised when p = 0.5, when the outcome is the least certain.
It is not only the binary entropy function which is maximised for a uniform
probability distribution; this is the case for random variables taking values in
larger sets as well. For a random variable X taking values in X , the entropy
is bounded above by H(X) ≤ log|X | [16, Theorem 2.6.4].
Definition 1.1.3: The joint entropy of discrete random variables X and Y ,
taking values in X and Y respectively, is
H(X, Y ) = −
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
p(x, y) log p(x, y). (1.3)
Definition 1.1.4: The conditional entropy of discrete random variables X
and Y , taking values in X and Y respectively, is





p(x, y) log p(x|y) ≥ 0. (1.4)
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Figure 1.1: The entropy of a Bernoulli distribution with parameter p.
The conditional entropy is the residual uncertainty of X after observing
Y = y and indeed H(X|Y ) is related to H(X, Y ) as follows [52, §8.1]
H(X, Y ) = H(X) +H(Y |X) = H(Y ) +H(X|Y ). (1.5)
From the above, we see that
H(X | Y ) ≤ H(X), (1.6)
and thus conditioning may not increase entropy. More relationships between
information theoretic quantities are shown in Figure 1.2.
Definition 1.1.5: The mutual information between random variablesX and
Y is defined as





I(X, Y ) H(Y |X)H(X|Y )
Figure 1.2: Relationships between entropy and mutual information [16, The-
orem 2.4.1].
Theorem 1.1.6 ( [16, Theorem 2.6.3]): The mutual information between
random variables X and Y satisfies I(X;Y ) ≥ 0 with I(X;Y ) = 0 if and
only if X and Y are independent.
1.1.2 Channel coding
Information theory gives a the mathematical framework for communications
in the presence of noise. In this section we outline the communication systems
and the key information theoretic measures. A transmitter, Alice, sends
a message to a receiver, Bob, over some channel. This channel may be a
telephone line, piece of optical fibre or a wireless medium, and is formally
defined later in Definition 2.1.2. If this channel is noisy, which almost all
8
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Alice Encoder Bob Decoder
m x y
Figure 1.3: A general communication system from Alice to Bob
physical channels are, then how can Alice ensure Bob receives the correct
message? This question is the basis for channel coding. Here, we use the
term code to refer to the method used to transmit the message.
Definition 1.1.7: A symbol code of an ensembleX is a mapping fromX into
{s1, · · · , sk}+, or a binary code when {s1 · · · sk} = {0, 1}. The representation
of symbol x is called the codeword and the collection of codewords is the
codebook.
Example 1.1.8: In Morse code the message is plaintext in the Latin alpha-
bet. The code is the dots and dashes transmitted to represent the plaintext.
The collection of all 36 codewords (representing a-z and 0-9) is the codebook








Table 1.1: Morse code plaintext and codewords.
has length one, whereas a dash, -, has length three meaning that the letter
e is assigned the shortest possible codeword due to its frequency of use.
In order for the code to be readable from left to right, one codeword
9
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must not be a prefix for any other. That is, the code design should be prefix
free. Morse code is not prefix free, as the code for ‘E’ is ., which occurs at
the beginning of the code for ‘A’. In Example 1.1.8, symbols occurring with
high probability (for example ‘E’) are assigned short code lengths. Indeed, a
‘good’ code takes into account the underlying probability distribution in its
design. The expected length of a code with probabilities pi and corresponding





which we wish to minimise. The act of reducing the length of our codewords
as much as possible is called compression and a lower bound for the expected
lengths is H(X), the Shannon entropy (Definition 1.1.1). Indeed, this is the
Source Coding Theorem [67].
Theorem 1.1.9: For a random variable X, where xi has probability pi, there
exists a prefix free code with an expected length E(L) satisfying
H(X) ≤ EL ≤ H(X) + 1, (1.9)
and no prefix free code has expected length less than the entropy.
A proof of Theorem 1.1.9 may be found in [52, §5.4]. This result shows
that information may not be compressed below the entropy in an error free
way. How well a code performs may be measured by its rate, defined as
follows:
Definition 1.1.10: The rate of a code is the ratio of useful information bits
to total information bits transmitted per second, measured in bits/s. A rate
is said to be achievable if there exists a code which conveys information at
that rate.
Codes so far have been designed per symbol, but often the underlying
probability distribution will have implications for strings of symbols. In the
10
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English language, for example, the pair ‘QU’ are far more likely to appear
than ‘QJ’. We may think of our decoder reading a string of codewords from
left to right, if they have seen a ‘Q’ they can expect to see a ‘U’ and so this
string may be compressed further than the string ‘QJ’. The optimal coding
scheme for this is arithmetic coding, introduced by [25]. In arithmetic coding,
binary strings have a one to one mapping with an interval on the real line.
These real intervals correspond to the probability that a sequence of symbols
occurs.
The real interval corresponding to a generic string x1 . . . xk has a width
p(xk | x1 . . . xk−1), (1.10)
which is mapped to a binary string.
Longer strings correspond to smaller intervals contained within the inter-
vals of their prefixes. That is, the string 010 corresponds to a subinterval of
01. The compression provided by arithmetic encoding is close to optimal [42].
Example 1.1.11: Consider random variableX with alphabet X = {x1, x2, x3}
with probabilities (p1, p2, p3) = (0.1, 0.3, 0.6) respectively. Consider strings
where each symbol is independent and identically distributed (IID) from the
previous choice. Initially, the interval I1 = [0, 1] is partitioned into the inter-
vals [0, p1), [p1, p1 + p2) and [p1 + p2, 1]. For strings of length 1, the encoded
string is the largest binary interval contained within these partitions. For
longer strings, the intervals are updated and then the same rule applies. The
following strings are depicted in Figure 1.4, with their probability intervals
and binary intervals shown.
• The most likely string of length 1 to occur, x3, corresponds to a parti-




• The length 2 string x3x3 (partition width of 0.36) is encoded as 11
while the string x3x2 (partition width of 0.18) is encoded as 100.
• The length 3 string x3x3x3 corresponds to a partition of width 0.216
and is encoded as 111. The string x3x3x3 corresponds to a partition
width of 0.108 and is encoded as the longer message 1011.
It can be seen that all strings exemplified above are encoded to messages
beginning with 1, this is because they all have x3 as a prefix and are their




















Figure 1.4: Arithmetic encoding partitions for Example 1.1.11.
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In Example 1.1.11, the symbol strings were IID, but as was motivated
earlier, arithmetic encoding is particularly useful when the probability dis-
tribution is dynamic as is the case in the English language.
Example 1.1.12: Consider encoding binary strings x1 . . . xn of length n and
fixed weightm. Initially the probability of observing a 1 is m
n
. After observing
x1, the probabilities update








If we use the example length 5 strings with weight 1, the arithmetic encoding
and probability intervals may be seen in Figure 1.5. Note that for the string
00100, the binary intervals of length 3 are not fully contained within the
probability interval and thus the string is assigned a binary codeword of
length 4.
1.2 Differential entropy
For continuous random variables, the summations in Definitions 1.1.1, 1.1.3
and 1.1.4 are replaced with an integral and the discrete probabilities are
replaced with the probability density function. To justify why it is possible
to do this, we first outline a quantisation argument from [16, §8.3].
Consider a random variable X with a continuous probability density func-
tion f . Split the real line into intervals of size δ: (tδ, (t+1)δ) for t ∈ Z. Then
the probability that the quantised version of X, denoted Xδ, takes a certain
value is given by
P(Xδ = t) =
∫ (t+1)δ
tδ








1 10 100 1000 10000
0











Figure 1.5: Arithmetic encoding intervals for length 5 strings of constant
weight 1.








δf(xt) log f(xt)− log δ. (1.14)
Then the differential entropy follows by the Riemann integrability of f .
Definition 1.2.1: The differential entropy h(X) of a continuous random
14
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f(x) log f(x) dx, (1.15)
where the integral is taken over the support of X.
One key difference from the discrete entropy is that differential entropy
can take negative values. Consider the uniform distribution over the interval









dx = log a, (1.16)
this is negative when a < 1.
1.3 Mathematical preliminaries
The following section outlines some required definitions and theorems for
studying convex functions and matrices. Since this thesis concerns multiple
antenna systems, this will mean understanding their channel matrices (intro-
duced in Section 2.4.1) and some convexity results for functions of matrices.
1.3.1 Complex random vectors
Complex random variables and vectors are defined similarly to continuous
real random variables, but with entries drawn from C rather than R. More
information about complex random vectors and Gaussian random vectors
can be found in [63, §7.9]. Throughout, we let i denote
√
−1.
Definition 1.3.1: A complex random variable, Z ∈ C is a variable of the
form
Z = X + iY, (1.17)
where both X and Y are real random variables.
15
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In the real case, there is an inherent ordering of variables so the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) makes sense to be P (X ≤ x) for some real x.
This ordering does not exist in the complex plane, and thus the complex
random variable is defined by the joint distribution of its real constituents.
Definition 1.3.2: A complex Gaussian random vector, is one which can be
written as z = x + iy where both x and y are jointly Gaussian random
vectors.
Definition 1.3.3: A circularly symmetric Gaussian random variable de-
noted Z ∼ CN(0, σ2), with variance E(Z)2 = σ2 is one where Z and Zeiθ







for z ∈ C.
Definition 1.3.4 ( [28, §7.7]): For matrices A and B, the generalised eigen-
values of A− λB are the values λ for which
det(A− λB) = 0. (1.19)
The generalised eigenvectors are the non zero vectors v satisfying
Av = λBv. (1.20)
Useful definitions and further background on random vectors, matrices
and their properties may be found in [58, §8].
1.3.2 Convexity
Definition 1.3.5: A function f : Rd → R is convex if its domain is a convex
set and for any any pair x, y in the domain, and any λ ∈ [0, 1]
f(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ λf(x) + (1− λ)f(y). (1.21)
16
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If the inequality is strict for all λ ∈ (0, 1), then the function is strictly convex.
Likewise, a function is concave if the inequality in Equation (1.21) is reversed.
The binary entropy function seen previously in Figure 1.1 is a concave
function. Convex functions are ‘well behaved’ in the sense that there are
established methods for finding their minimum values. Boyd’s book [10] on
the optimisation of convex functions details many such methods. One family
of optimisation algorithms are descent methods, which take a sequence
xj = xj−1 + t∆xj
such that
f(xj) ≤ f(xj−1)
until the minimum, or a value close to the minimum is reached.
Example 1.3.6: The gradient descent method involves searching in the di-
rection of −f ′(x) as in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Gradient descent method
input : x ∈ dom(f).
output: Minimum of f(x) within a precision of η > 0.
while ‖f ′(x)‖ > η do
Determine a descent direction ∆x = −f ′(x).
Choose a step size t > 0.
Update x = x+ t∆x.
end
Theorem 1.3.7: For positive semidefinite matrices X, f(X) = log det(X)
is concave.
To prove Theorem 1.3.7, we follow the approach of [10, p74] and consider
taking an arbitrary line
X = Y + tZ
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where X, Y, Z are positive symmetric matrices and t is some real number.
We may now define
g(t) = log det(X) = log det(Y + tZ). (1.22)
By restricting t to be such that Y + tZ is positive semidefinite, we may
assume without loss of generality that Y is positive semidefinite and t = 0
within this interval. Since X is positive semidefinite, there exists a matrix
X
1













































= log det(X) +
n∑
j=1
log(1 + tλj), (1.26)









is a positive semidefinite matrix and so 1 + λj ≥ 0 for each j). Standard
differentiation results give that g′′(t) ≤ 0 and thus f(X) is concave.
Theorem 1.3.8 ( [52, §2.7]): If f is a convex function then for any random
variable X
Ef(X) ≥ f(EX). (1.27)
This is known as Jensen’s inequality.
1.3.3 Linear Algebra
Wireless channels are modelled as matrices, as we will see in Chapter 2, and
consequently analysing them requires some results matrix algebra. This sec-
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tion provides the necessary definitions and theorems for matrices and vectors
used throughout this thesis.




It can be seen by properties of the trace that
‖A∗A‖F = ‖AA∗‖F ≤ ‖A‖2F . (1.29)





where λj are the eigenvalues of A
∗A.
Theorem 1.3.10 ( [33, Example 5.6.0.2]): For square matrices, the Frobe-
nius norm satisfies the submultiplicative property. That is, for square matrices
A and B
‖AB‖F ≤ ‖A‖F‖B‖F . (1.31)
Definition 1.3.11 ( [33, §4.2]): For a given Hermitian matrix, A, and a





Theorem 1.3.12: The standard complex polarisation identity states that
2Re 〈u,v〉 = ‖u‖2 + ‖v‖2 − ‖u− v‖2, (1.33)
meaning that ‖u‖2 − ‖u− v‖2 ≥ 0 if and only if 2Re 〈u,v〉 ≥ ‖v‖2.
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Definition 1.3.13: For a real positive definite matrix the Cholesky decom-
position is the factorisation
A = LLT , (1.34)
where L is a unique lower triangular matrix with positive diagonal entries.
For proof that such a decomposition always exists, see [28, Theorem 4.2.7].
Definition 1.3.14: The Kronecker product of m × n matrix A and p × q
matrix B is the mp× nq matrix
A⊗B =





am1B . . . ammB
 . (1.35)
Theorem 1.3.15: Let A be an n×n matrix, the derivative of the quadratic
form (see [57, §IV] for more on quadratic forms) is
∂
∂u
[u∗Au] = (A+ AT )u, (1.36)





In this chapter, we give the required background knowledge to understand
the communication models used in later chapters. We begin with the funda-
mental definitions and finish by introducing the 5G technologies which are
studied in later chapters.
2.1 Channels and capacity
So far we have considered coding and compression of data in an error free
sense. That is, what Alice sends is what Bob receives. In reality, there may
be some corruption or noise which alters Bob’s received message. At one
end of the spectrum, Bob may receive nothing useful and entirely fail to
understand what Alice sent. At the other end, Bob may receive the message
perfectly. In reality, the channel will be noisy and a scenario somewhere in
between will occur; Bob will make some errors. If Bob decodes a message
which is believable, but incorrect, how will they know that they have made
an error?
Example 2.1.1: To avoid errors, Alice may send each message T times.
Bob can then take a majority vote on the most likely message based on the
T received versions. This is called repetition coding and while it may work, it
takes a factor of T times as long to send each message, and a rate of 1/T in the
sense of Definition 1.1.10. As T increases, the error probability decreases,
but the communication rate is sacrificed. This is not always practical, as
information may be required quickly, or the cost of using the communication
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channel might be high.
The two key factors to consider in a communication system are the error
probability and the rate. Evidently, there is a trade off to be made between
the two. In the Example 2.1.1, we saw that by using repetition coding we
may sacrifice rate to improve our accuracy. For a given system, there is
an error threshold which is acceptable for its purpose. Teleconferencing or
gaming demands a high rate with a low latency. In these cases, more errors
are acceptable to the user. On the other hand for military communications,
for example, accuracy may take precedence over the rate. Naively one might
think the only way to achieve a zero error communication would mean the
rate of communication tends to zero. However Shannon’s notion of a system’s
capacity showed that it is possible to do far better than this and the rate of
communication can be positive for arbitrarily small error.
The plaintext that Alice wishes to send will be called the message denoted
m. Alice then encodes the message to a codeword, x, which they send over
a channel. Bob receives a potentially corrupted version, y, of this codeword
and aims to decode it, hopefully recovering m correctly.
Definition 2.1.2: A channel W is a function
W : X × Y → [0, 1]
for input alphabets X and output alphabet Y which satisfies
∀x ∈ X :
∑
y∈Y
W (y|x) = 1. (2.1)
The channel function can be thought of as a transition probability p(y|x).
Example 2.1.3: The simplest example of a channel is the binary symmetric
channel (BSC). This is the channel with a binary input and output alphabet
X = Y = {0, 1} and transition probabilities
p(0|1) = p(1|0) = p
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Figure 2.1: Binary symmetric channel with parameter p.
and
p(1|1) = p(0|0) = 1− p.
In other words, this is the channel where the bits are flipped with probability
p and correctly received with probability 1 − p. This can be seen in Figure
2.1.
We are now ready to define the capacity of a channel. With an arbitrarily
small error, information can be transmitted across the channel at a rate less
than C. If the rate of transmission exceeds C then the system will no longer
be considered reliable and the probability of errors tends to 1. Shannon
classified this in terms of the channel statistics, meaning that this capacity
is prescribed from the fundamental properties of the channel.
Definition 2.1.4: The capacity, C, of a channel with input alphabet X and
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output alphabet Y is the supremum over all achievable rates of communica-
tion
C = sup{R : R is an achievable rate for a reliable code}.
Theorem 2.1.5: Shannon’s Coding Theorem The capacity, C, of a commu-




where the maximum is taken over all input distributions and I(·, ·) denotes
the mutual information.
2.1.1 Continuous signals
In reality, all signals are continuous but computers only have a finite amount
of storage, we will first define how signals are reduced in order to store them.
Firstly, the signal is sampled at a rate and then these samples are quantised.
Definition 2.1.6: The process of taking a continuous range of numbers and
mapping these to a finite range of discrete values is called quantisation.
Example 2.1.7: Consider a continuous, real valued signal f(t) which fluc-
tuates above and below zero. We take taps of the channel at intervals of
length T and quantise as follows for n ∈ N
F (nT ) =
1, if f(nT ) > 00, otherwise.
This process outputs a binary string.
2.2 SISO Channel
In a wireless communication, the conventional model is that of a single an-
tenna at both the transmitter and receiver. This set up is also known as a
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single input single output (SISO) system, which has been the basis for many
historical results.
Definition 2.2.1: The SISO channel has input x ∈ X and output y ∈ Y
defined by the relationship
y = hx+ n, (2.3)
where y is the received message, x is the transmitted message, h is the channel
coefficient and n is the noise added during the transmission.
2.2.1 AWGN Channel
A particularly useful channel model is that of a Gaussian channel. This
closely resembles a real life wireless communication system [72, Section 5.1]
and conveniently, is the most tractable, mathematically speaking.
Definition 2.2.2: The SISO Gaussian channel is the channel with input
and output alphabets X = Y = C. The transition p(Y | x) is defined by
Y = x+ Z
where the noise Z is drawn from a Gaussian distribution
Z ∼ CN(0, σ2)
with σ2 denoting the variance of the power, which since the mean is 0 is
equivalent to the channels noise power.
Noise can be a result of random electrical processes in the atmosphere or
agitation of electrons in the hardware. Thus the total noise is a summation
of several small random processes. By the central limit theorem, it follows
that this sum will be roughly Gaussian.
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Theorem 2.2.3: The capacity of the SISO Gaussian channel with a transmit








Note that P/σ2 is the signal to noise ratio (SNR) of the channel.
This tells us, somewhat unsurprisingly, that the optimal transmit strategy
to achieve capacity is to use all of the available power resource. It is also
known that Gaussian signalling achieves the capacity (see [16, §9.1]) meaning




Figure 2.2: The capacity of a Gaussian channel vs SNR.
Heuristic proof of Theorem 2.2.3.
A heuristic proof of the AWGN capacity, found in [72, §5.1.2] is detailed







Figure 2.3: The capacity can be seen as the maximal number of non over-
lapping noise spheres inside the main sphere.
achievability and converse of the theorem can be found.
Let x be a blocklength n message with Gaussian entries and transmit
power of P . The received message is y = x + n where n is a length n vector
of Gaussian noise, with noise variance σ2.
By the law of large numbers, y lies, with high probability, in a sphere of
radius
√
n(P + σ2). As the blocklength n increases, the observed variance of
the noise will approximate σ2 and thus the observed signal y will, with high
probability, lie near the surface of a noise sphere of radius
√
nσ2 as seen in
Figure 2.3.
To achieve a zero error probability, it is required that the noise spheres do
not overlap, so that each y may be decoded uniquely to the corresponding x.
The volume of a general n dimensional sphere with radius r is proportional
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to rn [14, §1.4]. Therefore the maximum number of messages we can send











which gives the maximum number of noise spheres that fit inside the larger
sphere. Hence the maximum bits per symbol which may be communicated,





















which is the desired result.
2.3 Diversity and fading
Note that all channels defined in Chapter 1 were static. That is, the channel
transition probabilities are fixed. In any physical channel there is fading and
noise which varies over time and due to other factors such as the physical
location or interference from other devices. Any wireless signal will have
multipath components due to reflection, refraction etc. These multipaths
will have differing arrival times at the receiver due to varying delays.
Diversity exploits the random fading of channels and is based on the
idea that several statistically independent channels are unlikely to experience
severe fading in the same places of the signal. A typical diversity system
would sum at least two, but often many more, received versions of the same
signal transmitted over multiple paths, each equipped with different fading
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statistics. A wireless communication between two devices happens over a
fading channel. If we move one of those devices, the channel statistics will
be different. Thus it is possible to exploit physical locations of transmitting
devices in relation to the receiving device, known as spatial diversity.
Although the channel is modelled as a random variable, in this thesis
we often refer to the channel coefficients as though they are fixed. This is
because we assume we are working within the coherence time of the channel,
defined as follows.
Definition 2.3.1: The coherence time of a channel is the duration of time
in which the channel statistics are considered to be static.
2.3.1 Dispersive channels
The random fading described in Section 2.3 may also contribute to disper-
sive channels. An environment is described as highly dispersive if the char-
acteristics change vastly over time, or it has a short coherence time (Defini-
tion 2.3.1). A simple multipath scenario is one where two multipath com-
pononents arrive with similar power. These multipaths arrive with a time
spread. Since each multipath component takes a unique path from trans-
mitter to receiver, they experience a unique time of flight. This spread of
timing leads to such a channel model being described as time dispersive and
the ouput is based on taking taps of the channel.
Definition 2.3.2: A channel is said to be time dispersive if several multi-
paths arrive at different times. For L taps of the channel, the signal input is
x
y = h ? x + n, (2.8)
where ? represents convolution. The L-tap channel is represented by vector
h of length L and the channel noise is the length L vector n. The received
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where xj = 0 for j < 0.
2.4 The Evolution of Telecommunications
When Shannon wrote ‘A Mathematical Theory of Communications’ [67], the
world was a different place and he based most of his work on wired tele-
graphs as the basic communication model [70, §16]. In the years that have
passed since, there have been several generations of cellular communications.
Despite this, the basic theories developed by Shannon remain the building
blocks for studying these systems and are still of the utmost importance.
Generation Changes in services offered Year
1G Voice calling 1979
2G SMS capabilities, data rates up to 200kb/s 1991
3G Data rates of 2Mb/s 1998
4G Reduced cost of data, voice over IP 2008
Table 2.1: A high level overview of the new services offered in the evolution
from 1G to 4G [20].
With first generation communications (1G), voice calling was the main
offering. Second generation (2G) continued to improve these offerings and
was the first generation to introduce mobile data capabilities. Since 2G, de-
mand for data has risen and continues to rise with modern needs superseding
the offerings of fourth generation (4G) [20]. The key goals for 5G are detailed
in Figure 2.4 and are driven by a number of industries and applications (see
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Figure 2.4: Goals for 5G communications compared to 4G
Table 2.2). As the needs and requirements for communications grow and
develop, so do the technologies to meet these demands [9].
An increase in data rates can come from several avenues. We can increase
the power we transmit at, but this has an immediate limitation in a mobile
device since the battery life is finite and is impractical beyond a certain
level due to safety concerns for users and the interference caused for other
devices. Increasing the frequency resource may enable a higher transmission
rate theoretically but bandwidth is a limited and expensive resource with
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Goal Example use case
Low latency Connected autonomous vehicles
Higher data rates High definition video streaming
Higher wireless capacity Dense areas of mobile users
Lower power Sensor networks
Table 2.2: Driving factors for future wireless
access determined by policy. Utilising diversity, as explained in Section 2.3,
is a fruitful way to achieve these higher data rates and indeed spatial and
power diversity are present in the 5G specifications [55] as we will see in the
following sections.
2.4.1 MIMO and massive MIMO
Using the same power and frequency resources, multiple antenna systems can
achieve higher data rates than their single antenna counterparts by exploiting
the spatial diversity of the antennas. Theoretical results by Telatar [71]
and numerical results [27] in the late 1990s showed the potential gains for
MIMO systems, even with small numbers of antennas. For multiple users,
MIMO systems can improve data throughput by directing energy towards the
required user [11, §1.2], reducing interference issues. Since the early results,
MIMO has become well a well established technology, available in WiFi since
2006 [2, §C].
MIMO systems exploit spatial diversity by placing the multiple antennas
far enough apart from one another that they can be assumed to be statis-
tically independent. This distance is at least half of the wavelength. Each
transmit antenna has a different channel between each receive antenna and
the channel gains may now be represented as a matrix rather than a single
number in the SISO case.
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Definition 2.4.1: An n×m MIMO system is one with n transmit antennas
and m receive antennas has a corresponding channel matrix, H where entry
Hij corresponds to the channel from antenna i at the transmitter to antenna
j at the receiver.
Echoing Equation (2.3), the received vector in a MIMO system is
y = Hx + n. (2.10)
Where x is the n × 1 column vector containing the transmitted signal, y is
the m× 1 column vector containing the received signals at each antenna and
n is the column vector of noise present in each channel.
Alice Bob
Figure 2.5: A 3× 2 MIMO system.
Capacity of the Gaussian MIMO Channel
The Gaussian MIMO channel, which this thesis concentrates on, is a MIMO
system with a Gaussian noise vector (Definition 2.2.2) and independent and
identically distributed (IID) Gaussian entries for H.
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Theorem 2.4.2: The capacity of a MIMO channel with Gaussian channel
matrix H and input covariance matrix Q was found in [71] to be
max
Q
log det(I +HQH∗), (2.11)
where the maximum is taken over input distributions and subject to a power
constraint P .
Using Theorem 1.3.7 it can be seen that the capacity of a MIMO channel
is a concave optimisation, and therefore mathematically tractable.
Massive MIMO
MIMO antenna systems are being scaled up in current research [64] as well
as in practical applications for 5G to ‘massive’ MIMO. In a massive MIMO
system the number of antennas (typically over one hundred) at the base
station far exceeds the number of users. Massive MIMO is a technology
for unlocking higher data rates and is considered to be a central technology
for the development of 5G [1]. Practical results and trials such as those
undertaken at the University of Bristol [31] have confirmed the theoretical
promise.
2.4.2 Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access
Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA) is a multiplexing technique in the
code or power domain, which is particularly useful when users have very dif-
ferent channels and path loss characteristics since it exploits their channel
diversity. In this thesis, NOMA in the power domain is considered. NOMA
in this form was introduced by Saito et. al in [65] and is a part of the
5G specification [5, 19] due to the increased coverage and good spectral effi-
ciency [18,37].
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It is typically considered for the downlink (base station to users) but
may be implemented in the uplink also [32] however this section concerns a
downlink NOMA system. Under this framework, the base station transmits
a linear combination of messages which are allocated varying power resources
depending on their channel quality. The receivers commonly use Successive
Interference Cancellation (SIC) to retrieve their signal. Users share a fre-
quency and time slot but the power allocated to each user differs depending
on their channel quality. Simply, a user with a poor channel is allocated a





Figure 2.6: Power allocation in a NOMA system where User 2 has a worse
channel than User 1.
In order to implement this, users with highly different channel character-
istics are paired.
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Example 2.4.3: Highly different channel characteristics may occur when
users are physically located far apart. Consider a pair of one near and one
far user. Suppose that User 1 is closer to the base station and User 2 is
further away with channel coefficients h1 and h2 respectively, then the base
station transmits the message s = α1s1 +α2s2 where si is the signal intended




2 = 1. In
this example, α1 ≤ α2.
For i = 1, 2, user i receives the message
yi = hi(α1s1 + α2s2) + ni (2.12)
where hi is the channel coefficient and ni is Gaussian noise and user interfer-
ence with noise power Ni. User 2 treats the message for User 1 as noise as
follows
y2 = h2α2s2 + h2α1s1 + n2︸ ︷︷ ︸
noise
. (2.13)
User 1 uses SIC to retrieve their message; first they find s2 (which is an
easier problem than for User 2, because they are closer to the base station),
then they subtract this and solve for s1.
Assuming that User 1 can perfectly decode s2, the two users have rates















It can be seen that the performance of the system depends heavily on the
power allocations, α1 and α2. The further user, User 2, does not need a SIC
receiver, which reduces the complexity requirement for their system.
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2.4.3 MIMO NOMA
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA), introduced in Section 2.4.2, is an
enabling technology for 5G new radio [22, 35], due to the performance gains
obtained when users have highly different channels. Performance of NOMA
for single antennas at each of the users has been considered, both in the
original NOMA paper by [65] and further in [24]. It was shown that, asymp-
totically, NOMA performs similarly to an opportunistic orthogonal multiple
access schemes (OMA) [24] despite the potentially unfavourable conditions
with many of the users having worse channel gains.
Since 5G uses MIMO and Massive MIMO technology [2], it is natural
to ask whether MIMO and NOMA can be combined to deliver enhanced
throughput relative to either scheme acting alone.
Indeed, these techniques have been successfully combined in a number of
scenarios. It has been shown that, even with a loose interpretation of the
need for differing channel conditions, gains from MIMO-NOMA schemes can
be realised for internet of things (IoT) devices [21]. One multi-user MIMO-
NOMA scheme of note was proposed by Ding, Schober and Poor [23], and
has attracted considerable attention. Their scheme involves the base station
transmitting a linear combination of messages, mixed using a precoding ma-
trix P . This matrix P is carefully designed in terms of the row spaces of
the downlink channel matrices, in order to achieve signal alignment. The
key property is that, for each receiver, all but one of the interfering messages
are aligned in the same vector subspace, and so can be removed by projec-
tion into an orthogonal space, effectively reducing the system to a standard
two-user NOMA situation. We give more details in Section 5.2.
37




With modern day communications being used for a vast array of applications,
from banking to healthcare, it is not surprising that security is of the utmost
importance. 5G networks were required to provide 1000 times the data rates
of 4G [30] which requires the emergence of new technologies. These tech-
nologies provide great promise for physical layer security but for many, this
hasn’t been investigated.
In this chapter, we review the current literature in the relevant areas of
physical layer security. We begin with an example of a physical layer security
scheme. We then outline the early evolution of physical layer security followed
by the relevant literature, including the current state of the art, required for
Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
3.1 Introduction
Physical layer security concerns any security measures and protocols occur-
ring at layer 1 of the Open Systems Interconnection reference model (see
Table 1). The core concept for security at this layer is to exploit the noise
present in the communication channel to guarantee that a passive eavesdrop-
per receives no useful information.
3.1.1 Shannon’s Cryptosystem
The original model for studying physical layer security is known as Shannon’s
cryptosystem and comes from [68]. In this system, Alice and Bob share a
39
Chapter 3. Physical Layer Security
secret key K which is used to encrypt Alice’s message, M , into a codeword
X. This system is noiseless, therefore Bob and Eve both receive X with no
errors.
Definition 3.1.1: A system is said to have perfect secrecy when the mutual
information
I(M ;X) = 0,
where M is the original message and X is the encoded message. Equivalently







Figure 3.1: Shannon’s cryptosystem
When a system has perfect secrecy, the best that an eavesdropper can
do is randomly guess the transmitted message as they have gained no useful
information from their observation, regardless of computational power, since
M and X are statistically independent.
Theorem 3.1.2 (Shannon [68]): It is possible to achieve perfect secrecy if
and only if H (K) ≥ H (M).
Proof. The proof uses a series of identities and inequalities. The following
version follows that of [6, Proposition 3.1]. Since K, M and X are discrete,
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we have that H (K|XM) ≥ 0, and so the first inequality follows:
H(K) ≥ H (K)−H (K|XM) (3.1)
≥ H (K|X)−H (K|XM) (3.2)
= I (K;M |X) (3.3)
= H (M |X)−H (M |KX) (3.4)
= H (M |X) (3.5)
= H (M) . (3.6)
Here, Equation (3.2) follows since conditioning does not increase the entropy
(see Definition 1.1.4) and Equations (3.3) and (3.4) follow by the definitions
of mutual information (see Definition 1.1.5).
The quantity H (M |KX) = 0 by the definitions of M , K and X and so
the equality in Equation (3.5) follows. Finally, if a coding scheme achieves
perfect secrecy, then H (M |X) = H (M) and so the result follows.
Remark 3.1.3: The constraint introduced in Theorem 3.1.2 means that,
in general, the secret key must be at least as long as the message Alice is
transmitting to obtain perfect secrecy. In a realistic setup, this is highly
restrictive as key management becomes difficult.
The assumed lack of noise and key management issues makes the results
of Shannon’s cryptosystem less applicable to a ‘real world’ noisy scenario
however, the results show that it is possible to communicate securely without
any requirement on computational power.
3.1.2 Wyner’s Wiretap Channel
Shannon’s results assume error free and noiseless channels, which means that
Bob and Eve see the same message and Bob must gain their advantage only
through the use of a secret key. Wyner proposed, in [73], a system without
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a shared key, but rather where the noise and channel properties are used
to secure the communication. This approach solves both the problem of
the length of the secret key required in Section 3.1.1 and the issue that the
original cryptosystem was noiseless and therefore less applicable to real world
systems. This setup is known as Wyner’s wiretap channel and is the typical
framework used for physical layer security. Alice is sending a message M ,
and encodes this to X. Bob receives Y and Eve receives a different signal,
Z.
While maintaining a reliable communication with Bob, Alice now has the












Figure 3.2: Wyner’s wiretap channel [73].
3.1.3 Measuring secrecy
Intuitively, eavesdroppers fail if they make a mistake, that is, their error
probability is 1 or very close. However Eve can always take a random guess,
and they might get lucky, meaning their error probability is not quite 1.
A better way of looking at secrecy is in terms of the encoding giving no
useful information about a transmitted message, meaning that Eve’s best
method is to take a random guess. This is the definition of perfect secrecy
(Definition 3.1.1) but as we have seen, this requires a shared secret key which
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is longer than the message and a noiseless environment. So how else may
we measure secrecy when these ideal conditions no longer hold? Wyner’s
work requires that, asymptotically with the blocklength, n, of the code, the
mutual information rate of the input message and Eve’s observation is 0.
This secrecy measure is known as weak secrecy.
Definition 3.1.4: The criterion for weak secrecy is met if for any ε > 0 there









I(M ;Z)→ 0 (3.8)
where the limit is in the blocklength and taken symbol by symbol.
As the blocklength n increases, the expression above tends to 0 regardless
of the scheme used. Thus it is possible to meet the criterion with a flawed
scheme. The criterion was later strengthened in [54] to overcome these issues
of aggregate information leakage - to obtain strong secrecy.
Definition 3.1.5: The criterion for strong secrecy is met if the limit
I(M ;Z)→ 0, (3.9)
tends to 0 with an increased blocklength.
Both M and Z are of length n, and the mutual information in Equation
3.9 is taken over the symbols and not the entire block. That is,
I(M1, . . . ,Mn;Z1, . . . , Zn)→ 0. (3.10)
This criterion depends on the probability distribution of the message, and
it has been argued (for example in [8]) that this is a drawback of using strong
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Figure 3.3: Implication chain for secrecy metrics
secrecy as a metric. This had led to metrics such as semantic secrecy, coined
in [4], which is related to the cryptographic definition of semantic security.
Semantic security removes this dependence on the probability distribution
of the input message by measuring secrecy in terms of the Advantage of the
eavesdropper. Having an advantage bounded above by some security thresh-
old δ means that knowledge of Z may increase the probability of guessing
some function of M by at most δ. Semantic secrecy is the ‘strongest’ metric,
as semantic secrecy implies strong and weak secrecy. The full implication
chain of the outlined metrics can be seen in Figure 3.3. We note that when
a system has perfect secrecy, all outlined secrecy metrics are equal to zero.
For the purposes of this thesis, we concentrate on the idea of strong
secrecy, as this is a fundamental property relying only on the channel char-
acteristics. It has been shown that when a system meets the strong secrecy
criterion, Eve’s error rate approaches 1 exponentially fast [61], regardless of
their decoding procedure.
3.1.4 Secrecy Capacity
Now that we have a measure of secrecy, we can return to the overarching
question of how much information can Alice send securely and reliably to
Bob in the presence of Eve in Wyner’s model (Figure 3.2). Recall the notion
of the channel capacity, given in Definition 2.1.4, which characterises the
maximum rate at which Alice can transmit reliably. We now wish to extend
this concept to account for an additional secrecy constraint. Firstly, we define
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the parameters of a code with reliability and secrecy constraints.
Definition 3.1.6: A code with parameters
(n, kn, εn, δn)
is one where n denotes the blocklength, k denotes the number of distinct
codewords in the codebook. The parameter εn denotes the error threshold,
which is the maximum tolerable error rate for the system. The secrecy re-
quirement is denoted by δn and is the maximum tolerable secrecy leakage
subject to some measure of secrecy.
If strong secrecy is the metric of choice, then δn would be an upper bound
on the mutual information in Equation (3.9).
Now the secrecy capacity is the maximum achievable rate for which codes
above exist.
Definition 3.1.7: The secrecy capacity, Cs, is the supremum of all rates R =












Maintaining reliability and secrecy seem to be conflicting goals. However,
it is possible to achieve both simultaneously, with the rate of communication
taking a penalty. This is perhaps the most important result, that the secrecy
capacity can be non zero, as it gives traction to the field of physical layer
security.
The central idea is to send useless information up to the capacity of
the eavesdropper channel and then use the remaining rate to send secure
communications across the main channel. This relies on the main channel
having some sort of advantage over the eavesdropper.
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Wyner was the first to establish the secrecy capacity for a discrete mem-
oryless channel in the case of a degraded channel (a channel which is affected
by noise) in [73]. This was then generalised by Csiszár and Körner for a non
degraded case in [17] as follows.
Theorem 3.1.8 ( [17]): For a discrete memoryless wiretap channel, with
encoded message X, the secrecy capacity is characterised to be
Cs = max{I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)}, (3.11)
where Y is the random variable associated with the legitimate channel output
and Z is the random variable associated with the eavesdrop channel output.
The maximum is taken over all random variables V and X satisfying the
Markov chain relationship V −X − (Y, Z).
Remark 3.1.9: The V in Equation (3.11) can be thought of as the variable
introducing noise in the channel, in Figure 3.2. Note that without the second
term, this is the capacity of the main channel (see Theorem 2.1.5) and there-
fore the the secrecy capacity is similar to the difference between the main
channel capacity and eavesdropper channel capacity.
3.2 The Gaussian Wiretap Channel
SISO Wiretap Channel
The most fundamental wiretap model is that of the Gaussian channel, de-
scribed in Definition 2.2.2. For the single input single output (SISO) Gaus-
sian channel, at time slot t, Bob receives
y = hBx+ nB
and Eve receives
z = hEx+ nE
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where hB and hE denote the Gaussian channels and nB and nE are additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean and noise variance σ2B and
σ2E respectively. Here, the secrecy capacity has been fully established.
Theorem 3.2.1 ( [43, Theorem 1]): The secrecy capacity of the SISO Gaus-


















This result shows that the secrecy capacity in this case is equivalent to
the difference of the capacity of the main channel and the capacity of the
eavesdropper channel. Therefore it is possible to achieve a positive secrecy
capacity if and only if the main channel capacity is higher than the eavesdrop
channel capacity or equivalently, the SNR from Alice to Bob is higher than







3.2.1 Gaussian MIMO Wiretap Channels
The conventional point to point results, also known as Single Input Single
Output (SISO) systems are well understood in terms of physical layer secu-
rity. We have already seen in Section 3.2 that the Gaussian wiretap channel’s
secrecy capacity is known, for example. However, many of these results do
not generalise to the multiple antenna regime. Let NA denote the number
of antennas at the transmitter, NB denote the number of antennas at the
legitimate receiver and NE the number of antennas at the eavesdropper.
The MIMO wiretap channel is the multiple antenna extension of the tra-
ditional point to point wiretap channel as depicted in Figure 3.4.
Definition 3.2.2: The (NA, NB, NE) MIMO wiretap channel is one where
Alice, Bob and Eve have NA, NB and NE antennas, respectively, and is
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defined by the following relationships. Alice sends message vector x while
Bob and Eve receive y and z, respectively, defined as
y = HBx + nB, (3.12)
z = HEx + nE, (3.13)
where nB and nE are circularly symmetric Gaussian noise vectors, each
with zero mean and identity covariance matrix. The system is subject to
a power constraint P such that the covariance matrix of the input signal, Q,








Figure 3.4: (3,2,2) MIMO wiretap channel.
The secrecy capacity for this type of wiretap channel was found in [40,
41,56] and is stated in the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.2.3: For the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel, the secrecy ca-





B)− log det(I +HEQHTE), (3.14)
Such that Q  0
where P is the power constraint of the system.
The general solution to Equation (3.14) is unknown, since the optimisa-
tion is a non convex one and thus difficult to solve. It would be desirable
to know the covariance matrix Q which maximises the secure transmission
rate, as this would give an insight to the optimal secure signalling scheme. It
is known that the solution to this is a low rank matrix [56] for the Gaussian
wiretap channel however there is no known way of constructing this low rank
matrix.
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the scenarios where Equation (3.14) is fully
understood - that is, known in closed form and an optimal signalling scheme
is known. Here, the single antenna is a subset of the multiple antenna case.
Number of Antennas at
Alice Bob Eve Secrecy capacity fully understood?
Single Single Single Yes
Multiple Multiple Single Only for (2,2,1) [66]
Multiple Single Multiple Yes [40]
Multiple Multiple Multiple No
Table 3.1: Overview of open cases for the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian
MIMO wiretap channel. Single means one antenna where multiple means
any positive integer, including one. Note that the work in Chapter 4 extends
the knowledge in the highlighted row.
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Fully Understood Scenarios
There are some families of MIMO systems where the secrecy capacity and
optimal transmit strategy has been characterised. Some significant cases are
outlined below.
MISOME Wiretap Channel
The secrecy capacity for a Multiple-Input Single-Output channel with mul-
tiple eavesdrop antennas (MISOME) with power constraint P is fully un-
derstood. This is the channel where there are multiple antennas at Alice, a
single antenna at Bob and any number of antennas at Eve (NA ≥ 1, NB = 1
and NE ≥ 1). The secrecy capacity from Equation (3.14) was derived explic-













where hB is the main channel vector and HE is the eavesdrop channel matrix.
Here, λmax denotes the largest generalised eigenvector (see Definition 1.3.4)
of the two matrices I + PhBh
T
B and I + PH
T
EHE. The authors showed that
the scheme which is optimal for secrecy, achieving the secrecy capacity, is to
transmit in the direction of the generalised eigenvector which corresponds to
λmax.
This is the only ‘general’ multiple antenna case which is fully understood.
That is, no additional requirements other than the Gaussian channel are
necessary for these results to hold.
(2,2,1) channel
For the case where Alice and Bob have two antennas and Eve has one, known
as the ‘(2,2,1) channel’, the form of Q is explicitly known [66]. Since the
solution must be low rank, and the matrix in this case has dimensions 2× 2,
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the rank of Q must be 1. The proof in this paper proposes Gaussian signalling
as a scheme which achieves the optimal rate, and then provides a tight upper
bound to meet the rate achieved.
It should be noted that [51] proposed an algorithm to solve the saddle
point of a min-max problem to solve Equation (3.14). Their work gives an
algorithm for solving the secrecy capacity of a general MIMOME wiretap.
Special cases
Table 3.1 gives the current state of knowledge for the general Gaussian MIMO
wiretap channel. Although the general cases remain largely open, improve-
ments have been made for cases with more constraints. A few are outlined
below.
• Constrained power: When the input covariance matrix Q is bounded
above by a general matrix power constraint S  0, the secrecy capacity
is known in closed form and Q has been specified in [12].
• Parallel channels: For a number of Gaussian parallel channels a num-
ber of results have been established for the broadcast channel. The se-
crecy capacity regions were established in [45] and the secrecy capacity
for transmitting a common message were found in [39].
• Full rank channels: A closed form expression for full rank Q has
been found in [49]. This work was then extended to the rank deficient
case in [50]. In these works, it is a necessary condition that the SNR
is finite.
Also of note is the case of the isotropic eavesdropper, that is an eavesdropper
with one parameter (the channel power gain). This differs to any cases
outlined in this chapter, as full eavesdropper channel state information (CSI)
is not considered. However it is proved in [50] that the case of an isotropic
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eavesdropper is the worst case for the MIMO wiretap channel. The optimal
signalling strategy is known here in closed form.
3.3 Achieving secrecy
So far, we have encountered the secrecy capacity and measures of secrecy for
communication systems. While these tell us that we can submit with perfect
secrecy, they do not tell us how to do so. The secrecy capacity, Cs, being
positive tells us that a code exists which can achieve the secrecy capacity but
finding such codes is another problem space.
For the SISO Gaussian channel, the secrecy capacity is achieved using
the full available power and Gaussian signalling [43]. Gaussian signalling is
also the way to achieve capacity for a Gaussian channel, without a secrecy
constraint, and this is why the secrecy capacity in this instance is exactly the
difference of the capacity of the main channel and that of the eavesdropper
channel (see Theorem 3.2.1). When considering semantic security as our
secrecy metric, wiretap lattice coding may achieve the secrecy capacity [46],
these are used since they maximise the error probability for the eavesdropper
at their decoder [26]. For example, a particular coding scheme based on polar
lattices [47] has been shown to achieve the secrecy capacity for the Gaussian
case.
More generally, to confuse an eavesdropper, Alice wishes to exploit the
difference in their channel when choosing a secure message. If the signal
is based on the main (Alice to Bob) channel, then Eve’s lack of knowledge
will prevent them from decoding the message. This is the basis of secret key
generation at physical layer, as Alice can use their channel with Bob to create
a secret key. As seen previously, key storage and key generation is impractical
for a number of reasons but this concept is used in the codebook design for
secrecy at physical layer. For example, Alice may use index modulation where
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the information is transmitted in the index of the codeword rather than the
codeword itself. An example of an index modulation scheme for secrecy is
the work of [38] where Alice uses CSI of the legitimate channel to generate an
integer value. This integer value is used as an antenna rotation index, which
is easily undone by Bob since perfect CSI is assumed. They show that by
doing this, their scheme had provable perfect secrecy. The work in Chapter
6 builds on such ideas to design a secure coding scheme and this specific
scheme is explored in further detail in Section6.1.
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Chapter 4
The Secrecy Capacity of a MI-
MOSE Wiretap Channel
In this chapter, the secrecy capacity for a Multiple-Input Multiple-Output
(MIMO) wiretap channel is discussed. We consider a passive eavesdropper
with a single antenna with Gaussian channels. The main result of this work
(Theorem 4.2.1) provides a concavity result for an equivalent problem to
find the secrecy capacity of such a system. This is done by reformulating
the secrecy capacity (a non convex optimisation problem with no general
solution) to a maximisation of a function with a scalar input. It is then
shown that this equivalent function has a concave region, meaning that ex-
isting convex solvers (see Section 1.3.2) may be used to efficiently find the
maximum and therefore the secrecy capacity. This work addresses the open
problem of the secrecy capacity for a MIMO wiretap channel and contributes
to the MIMO channel with a Single Eavesdropper (MIMOSE). The basis of
this work has been published as joint work with Oliver Johnson and Robert
Piechocki in [13], where all simulation and technical analysis was undertaken
by myself as first author. Section 4.4 is additional to this publication.
4.1 Introduction
Multiple antenna systems play a large role in achieving higher capacities and
thus are central in 5G technologies, with ‘massive’ MIMO being a central
technology for 5G and future wireless [34]. Security for any modern day sys-
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tem is vital however there are several fundamental questions which remain
open with regards to the physical layer security of a MIMO channel when
compared to the equivalent model for point to point single antenna systems.
Indeed, the secrecy capacity for a Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel, intro-
duced in Section 3.2.1, is one of these open problems. The work in this
chapter aims to addresses this, contributing a theorem which gives a region
where a MIMOSE channel has a concave secrecy capacity equation. Know-
ing when the equation is concave allows for the problem to be efficiently
solved, giving the secrecy capacity and thus the maximum rate for secure
communications for the given channel.
4.1.1 Theoretical setup
We begin by laying out the notation and system setup. This work concerns
a MIMO channel with NA transmit antennas and NB receive antennas at the
legitimate receiver. The legitimate users, Alice and Bob, are communicating
in the presence of a passive eavesdropper, Eve, with NE antennas. For the
results of this chapter to hold, Eve has a single eavesdrop antenna, that is
NE = 1 as depicted in Figure 4.1.
The channel between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver shall be
referred to as the main channel while the channel between the transmitter
and the eavesdropper shall be referred to as the eavesdropper channel. Their
channel matrices are described by HB, an NB × NA matrix for the main
channel and HE, an NE ×NA matrix for the eavesdropper channel.
The input signal, x, is drawn from a distribution with zero mean and co-
variance matrix Q  0, which is a positive semidefinite matrix. The received
vectors at Bob and Eve, denoted y and z respectively, are:
y = HBx + nB,






Figure 4.1: The MIMOSE wiretap channel
Definition Symbol
Number of antennas at Alice NA
Number of antennas at Bob NB
Number of antennas at Eve NE
Main channel matrix HB




Covariance matrix of input signal Q
Power constraint of input P
Table 4.1: Notation for Chapter 4.
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where nB and nE are the Gaussian noise vectors for the two channels
nB ∼ CN(0, INB)
and
nE ∼ CN(0, INE)
where each element of the noise vector is statistically independent. Similarly,
the channel matrices are modelled with IID entries assuming independence
between each antenna element. The matrix Ik denotes the identity matrix of
size k×k. The input signal is subject to a power constraint P , meaning that





E[xix∗i ] ≤ P.
Without the power constraint above, the capacity is theoretically infinite,
which does not provide much insight in a practical setting.
4.1.2 Secrecy capacity
The open problem we are addressing in this chapter is the secrecy capacity
for the outlined system setup. Recall from Equation (3.14) that the secrecy
capacity, Cs, for the MIMO wiretap channel was established in [56], [40]





B)− log det(INE +HEQH∗E) (4.1)
where we note that, since the mean of the input signal is always zero, the
maximum is being taken over all input distributions satisfying the power
constraint.
The optimisation problem in Equation (4.1) is not easily solved for Q and
the solution is only known for a subset of scenarios, which were outlined in
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Section 3.2.1, it remains open in the general case. The difficulty lies in the
fact that the optimisation is not convex and thus analytically challenging.
Knowing the optimal Q is useful for a number of reasons, some of which are
outlined below.
• The mean of the input signal is always zero, so the covariance matrix,
Q, is the characterising variable for the input distribution.
• The input covariance gives details for the optimal input scheme for
secrecy and rate requirements.
• Knowledge of the optimum covariance matrix gives the true secrecy
capacity.
• Once the secrecy capacity is known, any rate of transmission below
this is secure by definition, giving a secure region for reliable rates of
transmission.
The key contribution of this chapter is for the Gaussian MIMO wiretap
channel with a single antenna eavesdropper, a subset of the unknown MI-
MOSE family of wiretap channels. The secrecy capacity is examined for this
open problem and a region is established where the problem is provably con-
cave. The concavity of the problem gives an efficient method of determining
the optimal input covariance matrix associated with the secrecy capacity of
a system. The scheme given is valid for the MIMOSE channel where the
receiver has at least as many antennas as the transmitter. That is, NB ≥ NA
and NE = 1.
This family of antenna configurations overlaps with only two known cases,
the point to point single antenna case where Alice, Bob and Eve each have
one antenna, and the so called ‘(2,2,1)’ case. Both of these are detailed in
Section 3.2.1. Our results are compared with their results in Section 4.2.2.
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The theory of this chapter goes as follows: the secrecy capacity equation
is reformulated into a problem which is convex, this allows existing convex
optimisation tools and software to find the optimal solution to Equation
(4.1).
The proof relies on properties of symmetric matrices and functions of
the channel and thus for ease of notation we define the following positive
semidefinite symmetric NA × NA matrices which are used in the statement











4.2 Concavity region for the secrecy capacity
The key limitation in solving Equation (4.1) is the fact that it is non-convex.
In order to exploit existing convex solvers, we must first reformulate the se-
crecy capacity equation to an equivalent but tractable optimisation problem.
Recall from Theorem 1.3.7 that log det(·) is known to be concave and twice
differentiable for positive semidefinite arguments. It follows that each in-
dividual log det(·) term in Equation (4.1) is concave. This can be seen by
considering their arguments. Since Q is a covariance matrix, it is restricted to
positive semidefinite matrices by definition. The identity matrix is trivially


















are concave. However, in general, their difference is neither convex nor con-
cave. We will reformulate the problem in order to restrict the problem space
to a region where the difference is concave. Broadly speaking, this is done







such that s = det(INE +HEQH
∗
E)
and Q  0.
The following work is constrained to a single eavesdrop antenna since,
generally speaking, det(·) is not a convex constraint. When the problem
space is limited in this way, the matrix argument INE + HEQH
∗
E is a scalar
value. Since log det(INB +HBQH
∗
B) is concave and the maximisation is taken
over a convex set, it can be seen that by fixing the value of s, this becomes
a concave problem.
With s fixed, Equation (4.4) is concave however it is no longer equivalent
to Equation (4.1). In order to bridge this gap, we must vary our value of s
and take an overall maximum. This is the overarching idea which is formally
laid out in the following section.
For the optimal value of s, Equation (4.4) is an equivalent problem to
Equation (4.1) and consequently will yield the same solution.
4.2.1 Statement of theorem
Each value of s gives a separate convex optimisation problem in Equation
(4.4). For each optimisation, the output is a corresponding covariance matrix
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Q and the maximum value of the argument. We aim to vary s and take the
maximum over each of the aforementioned outputs.
We begin by defining functions of the input covariance matrix Q




f(Q) = log det(INB +HBQH
∗
B)− log s(Q). (4.6)
We wish to fix values of s, where s = s(Q) for some Q, and perform a
convex optimisation for f(Q) given this constraint. We then wish to take the




A plot of θ(s) can be seen in Figure 4.2. Motivated by the apparent con-
cavity of the simulation results, we aim to prove the concavity regions of
these curves. The simulations and figures presented in this chapter runs the
optimisation presented above for fixed values of s using convex optimisation
software CVX: Matlab Software for Disciplined Convex Programming [29]
but the theory holds for an arbitrary convex solver.
Finding the secrecy capacity is now a case of finding the maximum of
θ(s). This is facilitated by the following Theorem, which gives a concavity
result for θ which is the main result of our paper [13].
Let Qi be a matrix achieving the maximum value in Equation (4.7) cor-
responding to si, that is f(Qi) = θ(si), for i ∈ {1, 2}. By definition
si = INE +HEQiH
∗
E (4.8)
where the det is no longer required since NE = 1. Without loss of generality,
assume that s1 ≥ s2. Let st be a convex combination of s1 and s2
st = ts1 + (1− t)s2 (4.9)
for t ∈ [0, 1].
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Figure 4.2: θ(s) vs s for NA = 2, NB = 3, NE = 1 and P = 10 for a particular
HB and HE.
Theorem 4.2.1: For NE = 1 and any NB ≥ NA, then
θ(st) ≥ tθ(s1) + (1− t)θ(s2), (4.10)





− 1 ≥ max{λmax(HBQ1H∗B), λmax(HBQ2H∗B)}. (4.11)
4.2.2 Overlap with existing results
For the antenna configuration NE = 1, NB ≥ NA required for Theorem 4.2.1
to hold there is only one fully understood case. This is the ‘(2,2,1)’ case [66],
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where NA = 2, NB = 2 and NE = 1.
Example 4.2.2 (2,2,1): Figure 4.3 shows that the theoretical secrecy ca-
pacity found in [66] matches the maximum value of θ(s).
Figure 4.3: θ(s) vs s for the (2,2,1) case. The red mark indicates the theo-
retical secrecy capacity from the paper [66].
4.3 Proof of the concave region
The main argument in the proof of Theorem 4.2.1 involves a Taylor expansion
of a matrix term which is then bounded at the second order. The proof can
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be broken down into three key steps as follows.
1. Firstly, we consider the function θ(s), defined in Equation (4.7), for a
convex combination of inputs, st (Equation (4.9)). Using Lemma 4.3.1,
which is a second order concavity bound for the log det, we find a lower
bound for θ(st).
2. We then minimise the difference between the bound from Step 1 with
the lower bound required for concavity.
3. Finally, we rewrite these bounds in terms of symmetric matrices which
allows us to exploit properties of the Frobenius norm resulting in the
conditions stated in Theorem 4.2.1.
4.3.1 Step 1
In this step of the proof, concavity results from [15] are applied to the function
θ(·) defined in Equation (4.7). The use of these results allows us to find a
tighter lower bound than the usual concavity lower bounds.
Lemma 4.3.1: Courtade et al. [15, Lemma 15] For positive definite matrices
A and B and for any t ∈ [0, 1]





where λmax(·) denotes the largest eigenvalue and ‖·‖F is the Frobenius norm.
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Considering the linear combination Qt = tQ1 + (1− t)Q2, it can be seen that
Qt satisfies the constraint s(Qt) = st since NE = 1 and
st =ts1 + (1− t)s2
=t(INEs1 +HEQ2H
∗
E) + (1− t)(INEs2 +HEQ2H∗E)






θ(st) ≥ f(Qt). (4.14)
By Lemma 4.3.1, taking A = INB +HBQ1H
∗
B and B = INB +HBQ2H
∗
B then
f(Qt) is bounded below as follows.
f(Qt) = log det(INB +HBQtH
∗
B)− log st (4.15)
≥t log det(INB +HBQ1H∗B) + (1− t) log det(INB +HBQ2H∗B)
− log st + t(1− t)CmaxA,B).




+ (1− t)(log det(INB +HBQ2H∗B)− log s2) + t(1− t)CmaxA,B)
+ t log s1 + (1− t) log s2 − log(ts1 + (1− t)s2)
=tf(Q1) + (1− t)f(Q2) + t(1− t)CmaxA,B)
+ t log s1 + (1− t) log s2 − log(ts1 + (1− t)s2)
=tθ(s1) + (1− t)θ(s2) + t(1− t)CmaxA,B)
+ t log s1 + (1− t) log s2 − log(ts1 + (1− t)s2), (4.16)
since each of the Qi are optimal by definition.
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4.3.2 Step 2
In this step, we aim to minimise the difference between
tf(Q1) + (1− t)f(Q2)
in Equation (4.16) and the upper bound, θ(st) as defined in Equation (4.7).
To do this, we introduce a constant κ(s1, s2) and show that the following
Lemma holds.
Lemma 4.3.2: For t ∈ [0, 1],
t log(s1)+(1− t) log(s2)− log(ts1 + (1− t)s2)






Proof. Define a function g as:
g(t) :=t log(s1) + (1− t) log(s2)− log(ts1 + (1− t)s2) + t(1− t)κ(s1, s2)
(4.19)
where κ(·, ·) is a constant. We wish to show that g(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1].
By construction, g(0) = g(1) = 0 and therefore g(t) ≥ 0 in the interval
t ∈ [0, 1] is equivalent to g(t) being concave in this interval or when g′′(t) ≤ 0.
The second derivative of g with respect to t is:




Since s2 ≤ s1, g(t) is concave for the value of κ(s1, s2) in Equation (4.18) and
thus g(t) ≥ 0 on the interval.
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4.3.3 Step 3
Combining Lemma 4.3.2 with Equation (4.12), we see that Theorem 4.2.1













B := INB +HBQ2H
∗
B. (4.22)
Writing Q := Q1 − Q2 for simplicity, the Frobenius norm on the left of
Equation (4.20) can be rewritten as





= Tr (RR) = Tr (RR∗)
= ‖R‖2F (4.23)
where R is the symmetric matrix
R := KBQKB. (4.24)
In order to retrieve the value of Q from R requires that H∗BHB is invertible.
This implies that NB ≥ NA.
Similarly, considering the numerator of the right hand side of Equation
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(4.20) gives:





= Tr (RTRT )
≤ ‖RT‖2F (4.25)
≤ ‖R‖2F‖T‖2F . (4.26)
where T is the symmetric matrix





Here, Equation (4.25) follows by Cauchy-Schwarz, for any matrix C,
Tr (C2) ≤ Tr (C∗C) = ‖C‖2F ,
and Equation (4.26) follows by the submultiplicative property of the Frobe-
nius norm (see Theorem 1.3.10). Since both R and T are symmetric, the
following holds:
Tr (RTRT ) ≤ ‖RT‖2F . (4.28)
(s1 − s2)2 ≤ ‖R‖2F‖T‖2F . (4.29)








Since each of λ2max(·), ‖T‖2F and s21 is positive, it is possible to present the
conditions for satisfying Equation (4.30) as follows:
s1 ≥ max{λmax(A), λmax(B)}‖T‖F , (4.31)
and the proof of Theorem 4.2.1 is complete.
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4.4 Outside the concave region
The function θ(·) cannot be concave indefinitely, since the secrecy capacity
must be non negative by definition. A negative secrecy capacity would be a
worse regime than sending nothing, and thus a rate of 0 would be preferable.
We wish to show that the function does not have another maximum, and
therefore the maximum found in Equation 4.7 is the true secrecy capacity. If
we can show that there exists a cutoff, a, such that θ(·) is concave on [0, a),
is convex for (a,∞) and tends to 0 then this is sufficient.
In the proof of Theorem 4.2.1, Lemma 4.3.1 was used to find a lower
bound for log det(·). In this section, we prove a converse of Lemma 4.3.1 and
then apply this to θ(·).
Firstly, we define an M(x, y)-strongly concave function, and then apply
this definition to log det(·) to find an upper bound on the log determinant
of a convex combination of arguments (analogous to the lower bound in [15,
Lemma 15]). This is then applied in a similar manner to the proof of Theorem
4.2.1 to give a result about θ(·) outside of the concave region.
Definition 4.4.1: A twice differentiable function f : dom f → R is M(x, y)-
strongly concave between x, y ∈ dom f if ∇2f(tx+ (1− t)y) ≤M(x, y)I for
all t ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 4.4.2: For all t ∈ [0, 1], an M(x, y)-strongly concave function f
satisfies
tf(x) + (1− t)f(y) ≤ f(tx+ (1− t)y) + t(1− t)M(x, y)
2
|x− y|2. (4.32)
The proof of this lemma is largely the same as the proof of [Lemma 30] [15]
but tackles the problem from the other side (that is, to give an upper bound
rather than their lower bound).
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Proof. The Taylor series expansion of f for any two points x, y ∈ domf yields




〈y − x,∇2f(t0a+ (1− t0)b)(y − x)〉 (4.33)
≤f(y) + 〈∇f(y), y − x〉+ M(x, y)
2
|y − x|2, (4.34)
where Equation (4.33) holds for some t0 ∈ [0, 1] and Equation (4.34) follows
from Definition 4.4.1. Let w = tx + (1 − t)y, for t ∈ [0, 1]. Then applying
the above inequality to f(x) and f(y) gives
f(x) ≤ f(w) + 〈∇f(w), w − x〉+ M(w, x)
2
|w − x|2 (4.35)
f(y) ≤ f(w) + 〈∇f(w), w − y〉+ M(w, y)
2
|w − y|2. (4.36)
Summing t(4.35) + (1− t)(4.36) yields
tf(x) + (1− t)f(y) ≤ f(w) + t(1− t)




By definition of w, M(x,w) ≤ M(x, y) and M(y, w) ≤ M(x, y) and
therefore Equation (4.37) may be bounded above by
f(tx+ (1− t)y) + t(1− t)M(x, y)
2
|y − x|2 (4.38)
which proves the lemma.
We now give an upper bound for log det(·) for convex combinations, this
is analagous to the lower bound of Lemma 4.3.1.
Lemma 4.4.3: For positive definite matrices A, B and t ∈ [0, 1],
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Again, the proof closely follows that given in [15] for their equivalent
Lemma, but uses the concavity of log det(·) rather than the convexity of
− log det(·).
Proof. Since f(·) = log det(·) is strictly concave and twice differentiable for
positive semidefinite matrices, we may apply Lemma 4.4.2 to f . Therefore




Since ∇2f(C) = C−1 ⊗ C−1, where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product
(Definition 1.3.14). The maximum eigenvalue of this product is given by
1/λmin(C) (since eigenvalues of X ⊗ Y are the products of eigenvalues of X










where Equation (4.43) follows by the concavity of the minimum eigenvalue.
Combining Equations (4.41) and (4.43) gives
log det(tA+ (1− t)B) ≤t log det(A) + (1− t) log det(B) (4.44)




Using definitions and properties, we give a result describing the behaviour
of θ(·) outside the concave region.
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Theorem 4.4.4: Given st, let Qt be the corresponding optimal covariance
matrix. Then
θ(st) ≤ tθ(s(Q1)) + (1− t)θ(s(Q2)) (4.45)
for any positive semidefinite matrices Q1, Q2 such that Qt = tQ1 + (1− t)Q2





− 1 ≤ min{λmin(HBQ1H∗B), λmin(HBQ2H∗B)}. (4.46)
Simulation results showing the cutoff points for the convex and concave
regions can be seen as red markers in Figure 4.4. It can be seen that there
is a gap between these two, and this is expected since in the proofs some
conservative bounds are applied however, this is only a small region which
can easily be searched across.
Analogously to the proof of the concave region, the main steps of this
proof will be roughly the same.
1. Finding an upper bound for f(Qt) using Theorem 4.4.3.
2. Minimising the difference between the bound found in the first step
with the desired convexity bound.
3. Rewriting these bounds in terms of symmetric matrices and applying
properties of the Frobenius norm.
4.4.1 Step 1
Let Qi denote the matrix which achieves the maximum value of θ for si.
Recall the definition of s(Qi) = INE +HEQiH
∗
E, and for optimal Qi, we have
that s(Qi) = si. Choose st and the corresponding Qt. For some t ∈ [0, 1],
write
st = ts(Q1) + (1− t)s(Q2) (4.47)
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Figure 4.4: θ(s) vs s for a particular channel, showing the cut off points for
the inequalities in Theorems 4.2.1 and 4.4.4.
(s(Q1) ≥ s(Q2)) where Qt = tQ1 + (1 − t)Q2. Here we use the notation Qi
to distinguish this matrix from the optimal matrix Qi.
By applying Lemma 4.4.3, and using the optimality of Qt we may bound
θ(st) as follows
θ(st) =f(Qt) = log det(I +HBQtH
∗
B)− log st
≤t log det(A) + (1− t) log det(B) + t(1− t)Cmin(A,B)− log st (4.48)
for A = I+HBQ1H
∗
B and B = I+HBQ2H
∗
B. Equivalently, the upper bound
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of Equation (4.48) may be bounded by
tf(Q1) + (1− t)f(Q2) + t(1− t)Cmin(A,B)
+ t log(s1) + (1− t) log(s2)− log(st) (4.49)
≤ tθ(s1) + (1− t)θ(s2) + t(1− t)Cmin(A,B)
t log(s1) + (1− t) log(s2)− log(st) (4.50)
where Equation (4.50) follows by the definition of Q1,2 and the fact that θ(·)
is a maximum.
4.4.2 Step 2
We require the following Lemma.
Lemma 4.4.5: For all t ∈ [0, 1],
t log(s1)+(1− t) log(s2)− log(ts1 + (1− t)s2)






Proof. Following the proof of Lemma 4.3.2, this is a matter of showing that
the equivalent function g is convex in the interval for this value of κ.
4.4.3 Step 3
The desired convexity constraints follows by combining Lemma 4.4.5 and
Lemma 4.4.3. The desired bound is held if
t(1− t)
2 min{λ2min(A), λ2min(B)}
≤ κ(s1, s2) (4.53)





Chapter 4. The Secrecy Capacity of a MIMOSE Wiretap Channel
And so the result follows by the definitions of R and T given in the proof of
Theorem 4.2.1.
4.5 Discussion
Although the expression for the secrecy capacity is known for the Gaussian
wiretap channel, it is not generally known how to solve the optimisation
problem for the covariance matrix, Q. The method presented in this chapter
gives an efficient way to search for the secrecy capacity of a MIMO system and
a corresponding covariance matrix for the transmission. The use of existing
convex optimisation schemes makes the problem presented in Equation (4.1)
manageable. We show that it is possible to efficiently search numerically for
the maximum using linear combinations of variables.
For a fixed channel, the norm ‖T‖F is simple to compute. To find the
secrecy capacity, it is a case of picking a value of s1 and s2 and checking
the constraint in Equation (4.31). If the criteria is satisfied, then these are
in the concave region. It is therefore sufficient to use a standard concave
optimisation technique, such as those outlined in Section 1.3.2. If Equation
(4.31) is not satisfied, then an algorithm may be implemented to choose a
different value until we are in the concave region.
The transmission scheme corresponding to this covariance matrix will be
information theoretically secure since the user is guaranteed to be transmit-
ting at or below the secrecy capacity.
This scheme is specific to the case with NE = 1 and NB ≥ NA. This is due
to the requirements which arise in the derivation of the proof. Despite these
restrictions, this work covers a family of MIMO systems which are not fully
understood at the time of writing. For the situation with multiple antennas
at the eavesdropper, the current state of the art is the algorithmic approach
outlined by [51]. When the number of antennas at Eve is greater than 1, the
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Base station Mobile user
Uplink
Downlink
Figure 4.5: Massive MIMO basestations will have a far greater number of
antennas than the mobile users
problem of the secrecy capacity cannot be written in the equivalent convex
format as outlined in this chapter and the problem becomes far more difficult.
In the Gaussian setup, multiple single antenna eavesdroppers behave in the
same way as a multiple antenna eavesdropper. It is unclear whether this
helps in this particular scenario, but is an avenue for future investigation.
In order to achieve the desired capacity gains for 5G, massive MIMO
systems are a key technology [2]. This means that modern and future systems
using massive MIMO will have a high number of antennas at the base station.
Therefore the NB ≥ NA constraint in Theorem 4.2.1 would imply that these
results are limited to the uplink for a massive MIMO system, as in Figure
4.5 since mobile users will have far fewer antennas. In future work, it would
be interesting to generalise to the downlink of such channels.
It is important to note that this work assumes a static environment.
Since the work considers the Gaussian wiretap channel with full channel
state information (CSI), there is an inherent assumption that the channel
statistics are fixed. Thus these results hold within the coherence time of
the channel therefore the channel is fairly static, they are valid for a longer
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period of time. If we no longer assume a static channel, and instead suppose
that the channel matrices are unknown, or fading, then the dimensions of
the problem increase dramatically. For different types of fading, Equation
(3.14) is no longer the agreed formula for the secrecy capacity, and there are
far more degrees of freedom in the problem.
A practical limitation of any capacity result stemming from Shannon’s
work is the asymptotic nature of the results. While it is important to under-
stand the fundamental measures of systems, there is evidence that the ca-
pacity of a system may be significantly lower for finite blocklength as shown
in [60]. This means that the secrecy capacity could be an overestimate, par-
ticularly for low power devices with short blocklength such as internet of
things devices.
Theorem 4.4.4 is a weaker statement than that in Theorem 4.2.1. This
is because in finding the upper bound, and thus the concavity of θ(·), firstly
s1 and s2 are picked and then a convex combination st = ts1 + (1 − t)s2 is
taken. Since θ(·) is a maximum of f(Q) taken over all Q, we may upper
bound our statement by θ(st). In the proof of Theorem 4.4.4, firstly st is
picked. From here, it is not immediate that a value of s1 and s2 exist under





In this chapter, we consider a central base station communicating to many
users by sharing their resource. As well as the typical security and low error
constraints on the communication system, there is also a sense of ‘fairness’
which the base station must achieve. Our users may have multiple antennas,
including the eavesdropper, and their Gaussian channels will vary in quality
depending on their distance from the base station.
5.1 Introduction
Multiple access (MA) schemes enable many users to be served while sharing
the same resource. Rather than the classic two user case considered in Chap-
ter 4, a realistic scenario will consist of numerous users with a finite resource
such as bandwidth or power. A base station in a city centre, for example,
will be expected to serve all of the users on their network and must do so in a
way which is fair, and provides a reasonable quality to all users. On the other
hand, users aren’t necessarily aware of the location of the base station, and
will expect their phone signal to remain intact despite their physical location
being at the cell edge.
The multiple access scheme in this chapter is Non-Orthogonal Multi-
ple Access (NOMA), which is particularly useful for systems where users
have highly different channel characteristics, for example near and far users.
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NOMA is a multiplexing technique which is in the 5G specification, previ-
ously defined in Section 2.4.2. It has been discussed in Chapter 4 and Section
2.4.1 that Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) systems unlock higher
capacities and are being adopted in the communication systems of today. It
is therefore natural to consider combining MIMO with NOMA. The NOMA
system may utilise the channel differences to increase the throughput, while
the MIMO exploits the additional degrees of freedom (DoF) to further en-
hance this.
Given the promise of both MIMO and NOMA, it is logical to ask about
their security at physical layer. The work in this chapter demonstrates the
robustness of a combined MIMO-NOMA scheme (outlined in Section 2.4.3) at
physical layer, when in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. Bounds on the
eavesdropper performance are presented and it is shown heuristically that,
as the number of users and antennas increases, the eavesdropper’s signal to
interference and noise ratio (SINR) becomes small, regardless of how ‘lucky’
they may be with their channel.
We consider the scheme of [23] from the point of view of an eavesdrop-
per. To implement NOMA, the base station applies a precoding scheme to
the signal vector. This precoding gives a signal alignment to each user de-
pending on their channel. Owing to the inherent randomness of the wireless
medium we will assume that an eavesdropper has an independent randomly
chosen channel and as a result, the eavesdropper is extremely unlikely to
see the same signal alignment as the legitimate receivers. Hence, unlike the
legitimate receivers, an eavesdropper cannot easily remove interfering mes-
sages meant for other receivers, and will see an inherently noisier signal. In
other words, we argue that from the viewpoint of physical layer security,
the MIMO-NOMA scheme [23] protects its messages from eavesdroppers by
design. Further, from a Massive MIMO viewpoint, as the numbers of users





We will look at a downlink (base station to user) NOMA setup, and use the
same model and signal alignment scheme as [23, Section II.A]. Consider a
base station equipped with M antennas and a collection of receivers each
equipped with N antennas, where N > M/2 to allow for the use of signal
alignment.
Definition Symbol
Number of antennas each user N
Number of basestation antennas M
Number of user pairs M
Distance of user m dm
Precoding matrix P
Path loss funcion L(·)
Power allocation coefficient for user m αm
Table 5.1: Notation for Chapter 5.
Since we are considering near and far users, the channel gains are mod-
elled to be worsened with distance from the base station. Assume the chan-
nel matrices from the base station to the particular users are of the form
Gm/
√
L(dm) for a certain path loss function L which depends on the dis-
tance dm. For brevity, we let Lm denote L(dm) for user m.
We select M ‘near’ users (within a radius r1 of the base station) and
M ‘far’ users (between r1 and r2 from the base station) and pair them up
randomly. This setup can be seen in Figure 5.1. In particular, we consider
pairing near users m and far users m′ and creating an M × 1 message vector
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αMsM + αM ′sM ′

where si is the signal intended for the ith user, and αi are power allocation
coefficients with α2m + α
2
m′ = 1. Since user m
′ is further away, they require a
greater power allocation and therefore αm′ > αm.
The key to the scheme of [23] is the construction of an M ×M precoding
matrix P , which is designed to make it possible to remove interference at
each pair of receivers, and to reduce the problem to standard 2-user NOMA
by use of an appropriate detection vector v. This is formed via constructing
a matrix G = [g1 g2 . . .gM ]
∗, with gm being a particular vector in the





certain vm. Then P := G
−1F , where F is a diagonal matrix chosen to ensure
power control conditions are met at the base station1.
The base station transmits the precoded signal, which is given by the











(αmsm + αm′sm′) pi
)
+ n (5.2)
where N × 1 vector n is circularly symmetric Gaussian noise with covariance
proportional to σ2 6= 0. Note that the scheme in [23] has a factor ρI denoting
1Note this is different to [23, Eq. (10)] which defines P = G−∗D for a different diagonal
matrix. Since G has rows g∗i , and P has columns pj , the necessary condition [23, Eq. (9)]
that g∗i pj = 0 for i 6= j is achieved by taking GP diagonal. Here F = diag(f) where
g∗i pi = fi.
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Figure 5.1: User pairings in the NOMA setup based on [23].
shot noise (noise from interference); for the purposes of this work we will
assume there is no shot noise (ρI=0). If an eavesdropper cannot succeed
without interference, then they cannot succeed with the additional noise.
An N × 1 detection vector u is applied to ym. In [23], the choice u = vm
is made, where the construction of the precoding matrix P ensures that
v∗mGmpi = 0 for i 6= m and v∗mGmpm = g∗mpm = fm. This means that
interference is removed and the problem is reduced to a one-dimensional
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(αmsm + αm′sm′) + n (5.3)
where n := v∗mn is Gaussian noise.
5.3 Analysis of Eavesdropper Channel
Consider a passive eavesdropping receiver observing messages sent within
the system. We will assume that the eavesdropper has the same number of
antennas as the legitimate users. The eavesdropper has an N × M chan-
nel matrix of the form K/
√
LE, where K has independent and identically
distributed (IID) Rayleigh elements and LE = L(dE) applies the same path
loss function L to the eavesdropper distance from the base station. Without
loss of generality, we will assume that the eavesdropper is listening into the
message intended for Users 1 and 1′. Since User 1′ is further away, their sig-
nal receives a greater power allocation and thus will be easier to eavesdrop.
If they are unsuccessful in obtaining the message for User 1′, they will be
unsuccessful in obtaining the message for User 1. We aim to show that, with
high probability, the eavesdropper cannot gain useful information from the
message for User 1′.














where N × 1 vector wi is the ith column of W := KP and the other param-
eters and noise are as in Equation (5.1).
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5.3.1 Optimal Detection Vector
We will consider the SINR for the eavesdropper, under the assumption that
the signals si are independent with E|si|2 = ρσ2 for transmit SNR ρ. Consider
trying to decode message s1′ with detection vector u. The eavesdropper will










Given the assumption that the interference noise is 0, note that this is also
the SNR.













Proof. We can find the optimal detection vector by fixing
u∗w1 = w
∗
1u = |u∗w1|2 = 1 (5.7)









































Chapter 5. Eavesdropping a MIMO-NOMA Scheme
where W = W −w1 ⊗ (1, 0, . . . , 0) is the matrix W with its first column set
to zero.
Hence, a Lagrangian formulation gives






u− λu∗ (w1w∗1) u, (5.12)






+ LEIN)u− 2λw1w∗1u = 0. (5.13)


























is invertible. Hence, after
some algebraic manipulation, the result follows.
Remark 5.3.2: Note that the corresponding analysis will give the optimal
detection vector and SINR for the legitimate user. In general this will not
coincide with the choice u = vm made above in the analysis of Equation (5.1),
since that choice removes interference potentially at the cost of increased
noise, whereas our analysis considers interference and noise together.
From the point of view of Physical Layer Security, if the eavesdropper
channel has smaller SINR than the legitimate channel, the true message can
be protected by transmitting at the relevant rate. In order to compare the
two channels, we will compare the optimal SINR in each case, though note
that the expression [23, Eq. (15)] gives a tractable upper bound on the
optimal legitimate SINR.
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5.3.2 Bounding the Eavesdropper SINR
While Equation (5.6) gives a closed form expression for the optimal SINR, it
is stated in terms of the random quantities w1 and W . Hence, it is desirable
to find an upper bound not dependant on these quantities.
Writing Z = ρ(WW
∗
) + LEIN , and R(·) for the Rayleigh quotient (Defi-


























This gives a conservative bound, since it considers the worst case and not
the average case. However direct application of Equation (5.17) means that














where EW is the expectation of w∗1w1, and the second inequality follows
by Jensen’s inequality. We plot this result in Figure 5.2, which shows how
eavesdropper SINR decays with distance as expected, and that (owing to
lack of signal alignment) the eavesdropper performs worse than a legitimate
receiver at the same distance.
5.4 Large Antenna Limits
To examine how the system fares in a massive MIMO setup, we consider the
SINR of the eavesdropper as the number of antennas increases. We can also
87
Chapter 5. Eavesdropping a MIMO-NOMA Scheme
Figure 5.2: SINR vs User distance for M = 7, N = 5, ρ = 5 and legitimate
users as in [23, Example 1]. We plot the upper bound on eavesdropper SINR
from (5.18) in blue, the empirical eavesdropper SINR from simulation in red,
and the legitimate SINR in green.
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Figure 5.3: SINR vs User distance for M = 50 base station antennas.
argue heuristically in the large antenna limit, representing a Massive MIMO
setup.
Proposition 5.4.1: In the limit of N = γM for 1
2
< γ < 1 then SINRE → 0






Proof. Recall that N > M/2, so as M increases so does N . Thus we can
apply the Marčenko–Pastur theory [53], in a regime where the number of
antennas M is large and N/M → γ (for some 1/2 < γ < 1), we have that
λmin(WW
∗
) ' c(1−√γ)2M (5.19)
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for some positive constant c. Hence for any fixed distance LE, for M suffi-
ciently large the λmin term will become the dominant one in Equation (5.16)







































which becomes arbitrarily small for large M . That is, from any position,
with enough antennas and user pairs, no eavesdropping is possible.
5.5 Discussion
Schemes combining MIMO and NOMA provide great promise for the de-
mands of 5G new radio and are likely to appear in real life systems immi-
nently. Since security is a key factor in any communication system, it is vital
to investigate their robustness to a passive eavesdropper. This work exam-
ined the combination of MIMO and NOMA in the system proposed by [23]
where the message is precoded according to the legitimate user channels.
This means that the message is easy to recover by a legitimate user, but
difficult for users with a different channel.
It may seem that the eavesdropper could become lucky and, if well aligned
with the legitimate user, they could obtain the message. Proposition 5.4.1
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shows that as the number of user pairs increases, this is untrue and, regardless
of position, the SINR of the eavesdropper tends to zero and thus they can
obtain no useful information from their eavesdropping. The results in this
chapter assume that an eavesdropper treats messages other than the specific
one they are eavesdropping, as noise. This means the results in this chapter
look at the SINR rather than the secrecy capacity. It remains to consider
the problem of a more sophisticated eavsdropper who may employ successive
decoding, for example, based on their strongest channel.
A significant drawback of a standard NOMA system is that each user
must decode the messages intended for all other users [36]. The scheme
presented in [23] overcomes this through their choice of precoding. However,
this drawback remains for the eavesdropper, therefore the scheme exploits a
weakness of NOMA to the advantage for secrecy.
These results are promising for the inherent security of MIMO NOMA
systems. Since 5G networks are expecting to be dense [2] and the number
of devices continuing to grow, it can be expected that base stations will
be required to serve a high number of user pairs. The results in Section
5.3.2 are particularly relevant for such systems, and show promise for the
inherent security of MIMO NOMA. In the downlink, as the number of user
pairs increases, so does their number of antennas due to the setup of the
system based on [23]. A mobile user is unlikely to be equipped with a large
number of antennas so the heuristic bounds in Section 5.4 is not immediately
applicable to dense systems, although hints at their robustness. These results
are, however, applicable in the uplink which the scheme of [23] is applicable
to.
Since it is assumed that the eavesdropper views all signals as noise ex-
cept for the one they are trying to decode, the scope of this work is limited
to studying the SINR. If a more sophisticated eavesdropper is considered,
perhaps one using successive decoding based on their signal strengths, the
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overall system security could be reduced.
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Chapter 6
Secure channel coding scheme
In this chapter, we introduce a novel coding scheme which is robust to time
dispersion and eavesdropping. Multiple users share the channel and time
resource giving an almost duplex scenario. So far in this thesis, we have
discussed achievable secrecy but have not specified a coding scheme. Here,
we present a coding scheme with secrecy at the forefront of the design.
Definition Symbol
Number of legitimate users K
Channel length L
Size of codebook per user N
Number of active codes per user n
Transmission length M
Weight of codes m
Table 6.1: Notation for Chapter 6
6.1 Introduction
Time dispersive environments, as introduced in Section 2.3.1, are common in
urban environments, in this chapter we propose a novel and secure channel
coding scheme to thrive in such an environment. Combining elements from
the papers of [59], [38] and [62] we present a scheme which exploits charac-
teristics of time dispersive environments to efficiently encode and transmit
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information using elements of the legitimate channel, making it robust to
eavesdropping.
The key papers are outlined below:
• The scheme of [59], which is called Combinatorial Channel Signature
Modulation (CCSM), portrays the information content in the choice
of the codeword combination, rather than the codewords themselves.
The signal is constructed by selecting a subset of n codewords from
a codebook of size N to be ‘active’ (where n  N). Constructing
the signal in such a way, and using sparse codewords, gives a scheme
which is robust to time dispersion, and in fact excels in dispersive
environments. Their work builds on the similar work of [75] but reduces
the complexity by their choice of signal structure.
• The secrecy scheme in [38] is an antenna rotation scheme where
the Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) users generate a pair of
indices and secure their message using the indices. Specifically the le-
gitimate channel calculates an antenna and constellation rotation value
based on the legitimate channel characteristics. Since the eavesdrop-
pers’ channel is modelled as statistically independent from the legiti-
mate channel, the eavesdropper does not have access to the rotation
values. They therefore cannot undo the rotation and therefore may not
recover the original message. They prove that the eavesdroppers best
strategy is to guess, and thus perfect secrecy is achieved.
• The paper of [62] designs a codebook of constant weight codewords.
Their scheme gives an encoding procedure for constant weight code
constructions using arithmetic encoding techniques. The encoding and
decoding procedures outlined use simple logical and arithmetic opera-
tions and thus they can construct codes with long codelength.
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In our scheme, each user creates a codebook based on their channel,
where each codeword is sparse - allowing users to transmit simultaneously
and overcoming the need for complex timetabling protocols which are usually
required for a full duplex system. It is a hybrid of the above outlined schemes,
combining several of their advantages and thus our scheme is:
• Resilient to time dispersion,
• Does not need complex time scheduling,
• Efficient error detection due to constant weight coding and
• No requirement for a collision avoidance technique as users have access
to a shared channel.
We maintain the combinatorial aspect of the CCSM signal structure
from [59] in our scheme, as this was shown this to be effective in dispersive
environments presented by scattering effects. We also adopt their notion of
turning channel state information into codewords.
Each user generates a codebook where each codeword has a fixed weight
m and length M where mM . Here, the constant weight aspect is based on
[62], but used in reverse meaning that a short channel realisation is encoded
to a longer constant weight codeword. Typically, one would use arithmetic
coding to compress data and not expand however we wish to generate long,
sparse codewords and therefore employ this in reverse.
6.2 System model
Consider a system with K active, legitimate users, all transmitting broad-
cast messages in the presence of a passive eavesdropper, Eve, who does not
transmit.
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User i transmits a message x(i) which is passed through the dispersive
channel and convolved with the channel impulse response. The channel be-









of length L where L is the channel length.
Each user has a codebook of size N , and their contents is referred to as
their codeword span. Each codeword is constructed to be of a fixed weight,
m, and length M . The codebook is designed based on the channel state
information (CSI) between users. The sparsity provided by the requirement
that the weights m  M allows for an efficient decoding scheme and for
the system to behave as though it is full duplex, despite users only being
equipped with half duplex transmitters/receivers.
The combinatorial method of [59] is adopted, meaning that the messages
are encoded in the choice of combination of n out of N of the codewords span
rather than in the codewords themselves. Here n  N and thus there are
(Nn) choices for the signal. This means that the information rate is agnostic
to the type of modulation, as the useful information is in the choice of the
codeword combination.
To visualise this, we give a toy example where N = 6 and n = 2, the
signal construction may be seen in Figure 6.1. Here, the active codewords
(indices 1 and 5) are highlighted and summed to give the signal which is
transmitted. There are (62) = 15 choices for this signal.
The receiver then uses its knowledge of the channel and performs a max-
imum likelihood (ML) estimate to find the most likely combination of code-
words that made up x(i). This is discussed in more detail in Section 6.3.2.
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Figure 6.1: Example codebook and signal construction, the codewords in red
are active. Here the codewords are of length M = 100 and weight m = 2.
The codebook size, N , is 6 and the number of active codewords, n, is 2.
6.3 Constructing the codebook
We wish for the codebook to be some function of the legitimate user channel
to reduce Eve’s chance of success. Using channel quantisation, the legitimate
users derive a set of indices from their channel. This set of indices is then used
to permute the agreed codebook. This idea is related to, and generalises, the
successful secrecy enhancing scheme of [38], where they rotate the antenna
indices and prove that this obtains perfect secrecy. Eve has access to the
agreed codebook and the scheme used to permute the codebook however has
no knowledge of the channels used to perform the permutation and therefore
cannot succeed at decoding.
6.3.1 Code construction
Arithmetic coding, introduced in Section 1.1.2, maps a string of symbols with
an underlying probability distribution to a unique interval and corresponding
binary codeword. This method of compression means that high probability
variables are mapped to shorter codewords and low probabilities are assigned
longer words.
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We wish to create a codebook where each of the codewords is of a fixed
constant weight, following the constructions of [62]. An advantage of constant
weight coding is the simplicity of the error check. If the codeword is not of
a specific weight, an error has certainly been made. This can be tested at
virtually no cost to a decoder. Here, constant weight refers to the Hamming
weight. That is, the number of symbols not zero is constant.
Definition 6.3.1: A codeword c = c1 · · · cM is a constant weight codeword
of weight m if the Hamming weight of c is m we will denote this as w(c) = m.
In Example 1.1.12, we saw constant weight strings compressed into shorter
binary strings, for our scheme we wish to implement this in reverse. That is, a
binary string is elongated to a binary codeword of a fixed weight. In Example
1.1.12 the constant weight strings 10000, 01000 and 00100 are encoded to the
shorter strings 111, 101 and 1000 respectively. In our scheme, we would take,
for example, the string 111 and encode this to the constant weight codeword
10000 corresponding to the decoding the above scheme.
The codebook is entirely determined by the channel and the process for
doing this is outlined in Algorithm 2. Algorithm 3 details the reverse arith-
metic coding scheme to obtain a single codeword.
Example 6.3.2: Suppose we have a constant weight codeword c obtained
from a channel vector h by Steps 1-3 above. Examples of how to carry out
step 4 include:
• Let r = arg maxi‖hi‖, and apply a cyclic shift of order r to c.
• For i = 1, . . . , L let ri be the order index of the entry hi. The vector
(r1, . . . , rL) defines a permutation, which may be applied to c. This is
the method used in the simulations for this chapter, unless explicitly
stated otherwise.
Remark 6.3.3: The codebook generation outlined above is dependent on
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Algorithm 2: Generating the codebook.
Input : Channel realisation h of length L, desired codebook size N ,
codeword lengths M and weights m.
Result: {c1, . . . , cN} of length M and weight m.
Initialise;
1. Quantise h to a binary string v;
2. Apply Algorithm 3 to v to output constant weight codeword c;
3. Modulate c according to the modulation scheme of choice to give c1;
4. Derive a permutation or rotation index from h;
for i = 2 : N do
5. Apply the permutation derived in line 4 to ci−1 to give ci.
end
the legitimate channel state information (CSI). Without access to the correct
CSI, the codebook is difficult to recover. This is exemplified in Figure 6.2
where the example codebook seen earlier (Figure 6.1) is generated once with
correct CSI, and once with noisy CSI. Here, the correct channel is h and the
noisy channel is h + δ where δ is Gaussian noise with noise power of one
tenth of the transmit power, showing that even small changes in the channel
lead to an entirely different codebook. This is a property we will revisit when
considering the security of this scheme.
6.3.2 Decoding process
Each legitimate user has access to all codebooks and therefore any receiver
also has an effective codebook. That is, a codebook where the codewords
have been convolved with the channel. Users are not fully duplex, therefore
they cannot transmit and receive simultaneously.
Definition 6.3.4: To capture this, we define an erasure pattern for user j
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Figure 6.2: A correct codebook overlayed with a codebook generated from
an incorrect channel (dotted lines).











for i = 1, . . . ,M .
The effect of the erasure pattern is a ‘puncturing’ of the signal, where the






h(i,j) ? x(i) + z(j)
)
, (6.2)
where z(j) is the additive Gaussian noise vector for their channel and the
multiplication of e(j) is elementwise (and thus y(j) is a vector of length M).
Due to the dispersive nature of the channel, there will be a self interference
factor spread across multiple time slots, not just during their ‘on’ slots and










6.3. Constructing the codebook
x(1) x(2) . . . . . . x(K−1) x(K)
h(1,j) h(2,j) . . . . . . h(K−1,j) h(K,j)
Signals are summed
Self interference is removed
Erasure pattern is applied
ỹ(j)
. . . . . .x̃(2)x̃(1) x̃(K−1) x̃(K)
Figure 6.3: Decoding system for user j
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In this setting, a maximum likelihood decoder would be too complicated,
and given the sparsity of the messages we instead follow the CCSM paper [59]
and implement a sparse recovery solver. User j has to solve the problem








Such that w(x(i)) = mn for all i
where X̃ represents an M × K − 1 matrix where column i is xi and the
minimum is taken over all possible x(1), . . . ,x(j−1),x(j+1), . . . ,x(K).
Since the codewords are sparse and each signal x(i) consists of exactly n
codewords, the above decoding problem becomes a sparse recovery problem.
In [59, Algorithm 1] they reduce the complexity of the problem by removing
the requirement that exactly nm entries of each x(i) are non-zero. Rather
they solve using a Lasso algorithm and take the indices of the nm strongest
values, setting the remaining entries to 0 afterwards. That is, we solve the
problem








Such that ‖x‖2 ≤ mn for all i
It is important to understand the effect of the codeword length, M , on
the performance of the scheme. As the codeword length increases the effect
of the signal puncturing occuring from the erasure pattern (Definition 6.3.4)
lessens.
Figure 6.4 shows an increased performance for a longer transmission
length, due to fewer clashes in transmitting and receiving.
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Figure 6.4: Error rate vs SNR for differing transmission lengths, where code-
words have a fixed weight of 25 with 10 users. Here, N = 32 and n = 4.
6.4 Secrecy analysis
The design of the codebook in Section 6.3, is such that knowledge of the
legitimate channels are required to find the codebook. As demonstrated in
Figure 6.2, a small error in the channel can lead to a large error in the
codebook. Since the performance of an eavesdropper is inherently linked
to their knowledge of the codebook, this scheme promises security for the
legitimate users. However, the eavesdropper is passive and does not have
to content with self interference or the erasure patterns. In this section we
show that the eavesdropper is unlikely to do well and through a series of
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simulations, that their error probability is close to 1 unless they are given a
large (and unrealistic) advantage.




h(i,E) ? x(i) + z(E), (6.6)
where ? represents convolution. In other words, the signal received by the












t−j + zt, (6.7)
where zt are independent complex Gaussians with mean 0 and variance σ
2
E.










where the minimum is taken over sets of possible messages.
Following the paper of [48], we consider the case where a particular re-
ceived message set is decoded to some other message. We suppose the true
transmitted message set was x(1), . . . ,x(K) then the eavesdropper makes a
mistake when the decoder incorrectly selects at least one of the u(j). In gen-
eral this is difficult to deal with, due to the size of the problem space so we
instead consider the case where exactly one message is incorrectly decoded.
Proposition 6.4.1: Consider a system with K legitimate users, who have
transmitted the message set
{
x(1), . . . ,x(K)
}
and suppose that an eavesdrop-
per decodes these to
{
u(1), . . . ,u(K)
}
where
u(j) = x(j)if j 6= l, (6.9)
and ∆ = x(j) − u(j).
104
6.4. Secrecy analysis
Then using an ML decoder, the eavesdropper will make a mistake when
∥∥h(l,E) ?∆∥∥2 ≤ 2∥∥h(l,E) ?∆∥∥ z(E), (6.10)
where h(l,E) denotes the channel between User l and the eavesdropper and
z(E) denotes the additive noise for the eavesdropper channel.
Proof. Equation (6.8) means that the ML decoder will make a mistake when


















h(i,E) ? u(i) = y(E) −
K∑
i=1
h(i,E) ? x(i) + h(l,E) ?∆ (6.12)
= z(E) − h(l,E) ?∆ (6.13)
by Equation (6.6) and assumptions made above. And similarly, the argument
of the upper bound of (6.11) is z(E).
Inserting Equation (6.13) into Equation (6.11) and rearranging gives that
the decoder will make a mistake when
∥∥z(E) − h(l,E) ?∆∥∥2 ≤ ∥∥z(E)∥∥2 . (6.14)
By the Complex Polarisation Identity (Theorem 1.3.12), Equation (6.14)
holds if and only if Equation (6.10) holds and so the proof is complete.
Remark 6.4.2: If strict inequality holds in Equation (6.10), the decoder
will definitely make a mistake, if equality holds, the decoder can’t do better
than guess so will make a mistake with probability at least 1/2.
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Figure 6.5: Equation (6.10) holds when the angle, θ, is acute.
Proposition 6.4.1 can be interpreted as how well aligned the noise is with
the mixture h(l,E) ?∆, which is represented geometrically in Figure 6.5.
In reality, using a maximum likelihood decoder is not practical for this
scheme due to the size of the problem space. However if an eavesdropper
cannot succeed with a maximum likelihood decoder, they certainly cannot
succeed with another decoder.
6.4.1 Eavesdropper channel model
When the eavesdropper is modelled independently to the legitimate users
they do not have access to the channel in order to generate the correct
codebook. This assumption relies on the fact that they are over one half
wavelength away from the legitimate user, which is likely.
We use the Cholesky decomposition of a correlation matrix (recall Def-
inition 1.3.13) to generate an eavesdropper channel which is correlated to
the main channel. The legitimate channel is generated, as before, with IID
Gaussian entries. The eavesdropper channel is then designed according to
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the correlation model proposed by [38] as follows:
h(i,E) = ρh(i,j) +
√
(1− ρ2)g(i,E) (6.15)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1] and g(i) denotes an independent channel vector. Note that
this model is similar to a channel with an estimation error (as shown in [3]).
Under this model, the error probability for differing values of ρ is shown in
Figure 6.6. Here, it can be seen that the eavesdroppers probability of error
is at, or very close to, 1 each time. We infer that under this channel model,
without the legitimate system being compromised, the eavesdropper may not
succeed.
Results for a system with 10 users are shown in Figure 6.7. Here, the
eavesdropper has access to different numbers of the legitimate codebooks
meaning that their decoding problem has varying levels of difficulty. The
error probability is taken across all 10 users, so if they were correctly decoding
5 out of 10 users, we would expect ot see an error probability of 0.5. These
simulation results show that even in the unlikely case where the eavesdropper
has perfect access to 9 out of 10 of the users codebooks, they still make errors
at a rate greater than 0.2. In other words, they are incorrectly decoding more
than one user, despite only missing one users codebook. From a legitimate
users viewpoint, this is a pessimistic scenario, which would require perfect
CSI for each compromised user, and full knowledge of the coding scheme.
This is compounded as user numbers increase, and the broadcast nature of
the system enhances security in this sense.
6.5 Discussion
This chapter introduces a novel channel coding and multiplexing method for
time dispersive channels. This is particularly applicable to wireless ad-hoc
networks since there is no one user ‘in charge’ in such systems. The broadcast
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Figure 6.6: Error rates for a system with 10 legitimate users and one eaves-
dropper, with their channel generated as in Equation (6.15) for varied ρ.
Here, M = 300, m = 25, N = 32 and n = 4.
nature of the system reduces the complexity requirements for access control,
while the use of the channels in the encoding naturally enhances the security.
As the length of the codewords used increases, so does the performance of the
system since users are less likely to interrupt one another. This allows the
non duplex transmitters and receivers to behave in a duplex manner, which
increases the efficiency.
In order to compromise the system, Eve would need access to all users
codebooks, and not just one. In this way, the broadcast nature of this scheme
not only increases efficiency but also provides an additional layer of resilience
108
6.5. Discussion
Figure 6.7: Error rates for a system with 10 legitimate users with different
numbers of codebooks compromised to an eavesdropper. Here, M = 300,
m = 25, N = 32, n = 4 and ρ = 0.5.
against eavesdropping. If just one codebook is compromised, the eavesdrop-
per still has to contend with a large amount of uncertainty and fails with
high probability, as is exemplified in Figure 6.7.
It remains to fully quantify the secrecy of the scheme. In Proposition 6.4.1
we presented results for the case where the eavsedropper correctly decodes
all but one signal. To further generalise this is a non trivial problem and this
is discussed in Chapter 7.
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Algorithm 3: Generating a constant weight codeword using a re-
verse arithmetic coding scheme.
Input : v of length L, length of desired codeword M and weight m.




p1 = (M −m)/M ;
cdf = [0,p1, 1];
for i = 1 : M do
if vi = 0 then





Update a = a + r2−(i+1).
end
Update b = a + 2−L;
if a ≥ p1 then
c1 = 1;





for j = 2 : M do
if a ≥ p1 and
∑j−1
i=1 ≤ m then
cj = 1;
Update p1 = p1 + (M −m +
∑j








Conclusions and open problems
The work in this thesis considers topics in physical layer security for future
telecommunications technologies. The closed form of the secrecy capacity of
the Gaussian Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) wiretap channel has
remained an open problem in the general case. This thesis contributes to the
(NA, NB, 1) configuration, showing that the secrecy capacity is equivalent to
the maximum of a provably concave region of a function. We examined the
robustness of an innovative MIMO-NOMA system, showing that the eaves-
dropper SINR diminishes with a large number of users and with eavesdropper
distance. Finally, a channel coding scheme which performs well in a time dis-
persive regime. It is shown that this scheme is robust to eavesdropping and
interference. With the increasing use of multiple antenna systems, and con-
sidering power limitations, physical layer security provides an important way
to improve and compound network security, and this thesis has presented
novel ways to analyse the performance of such methods. A detailed conclu-
sion and outline of the open problems are given for each topic below.
In Chapter 4 we presented results on the concavity for the (NA, NB, 1)
MIMO wiretap channel, giving a provably concave and convex region (Theo-
rems 4.2.1 and 4.4.4 respectively). These results are notable since the current
literature does not address a general case (that is, a case where the transmit
regime is not constrained) other than with algorithmic and computational
results. Our results are validated in Section 4.2.2 by considering the (2, 2, 1)
configuration. Simulation results agree with the theoretical secrecy capacity
found by Shafiee et al. in [66].
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Our results hold for the case where NA ≤ NB, providing a baseline for
future work without this restriction. In the process of calculating the cutoff
points, there is a matrix inversion which introduces this requirement. To
find an analogous result for the general antenna configuration, results on the
channel matrices may be imposed.
Open problems: For a multiple antenna eavesdropper, the derivations in
our work are no longer concave and the proof does not follow. In the Gaussian
case, the multiple antenna eavesdropper is equivalent to multiple single an-
tenna eavesdroppers colluding. Hence the MIMOME wiretap channel could
be seen as a compound MIMOSE wiretap channel (see [44]).
The secrecy capacity, as with any capacity result, is an asymptotic re-
sult. These results are derived from blocklengths tending to infinity. Results
by [60] show that for a finite blocklength, the realistic system capacity can
be far lower than the asymptotic result.
In Chapter 5 a scheme combining NOMA, a multiple access scheme, with
MIMO is presented. Both are enabling technologies for 5G and future wire-
less, and thus these results are particularly relevant to current and upcoming
architectures. We showed that the system is inherently secure in the sense
that the eavesdropper has a low probability of obtaining the message sent
by the legitimate user. Further, the eavesdropper SINR diminishes with an
increase in the number of users - representing a dense network, shown in
Proposition 5.4.1.
As the number of user antennas increases, representative of a massive
MIMO system, the eavesdropper SINR tends to zero. This shows that the
shift towards massive MIMO for future wireless adds further levels of security
to systems.
Open problems: We presented results for one eavesdropper, where multi-
ple colluding eavesdroppers would be a valuable extension to the work. As
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discussed previously, one multiple antenna eavesdropper is equivalent to mul-
tiple single antenna eavsdroppers from a theoretical viewpoint. However, the
system in Chapter 5 is affected by the positioning of the users. Therefore,
multiple single antenna eavesdroppers may be able to optimise their location
to detect the strongest signals.
In Chapter 6 we presented a novel and secure channel coding scheme.
The scheme works particularly well in dispersive environments, where other
schemes may fail. The information is transmitted in sparse codewords of
constant weight where the information is encapsulated in the choice of the
codewords rather than the codewords themselves. This allows for simple er-
ror detection at the receivers and means the scheme is independent of the
modulation scheme used, making it applicable to a multitude of scenarios.
Simulation showed that the systems performance is enhanced as the code-
words become increasingly sparse (see Figure 6.4), due to the effect of erasures
caused by a user transmitting (and therefore being unable to receive) being
largely mitigated.
Open problems: It remains to quantify the secrecy in terms of the entropy.
Proposition 6.4.1 considered the case where the eavesdropper only has to de-
code one message, and gave criteria for the success of the eavesdropper. That
is, we considered the event where any codeword ui has a higher probability
than the real codeword x given the received signal, y. For a specific codeword
ui, the probability of this type of error is bounded by




where this corresponds to [48, Equation (2)] and is found by applying the
Markov inequality. To bound the general case, we consider Equation (7.1)
for all pairwise errors. By applying the union bound, Lomnitz and Feder
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where N is the size of the codebooks and M is the length of the codewords.
Given that the received codewords are not IID, and have a block de-
pendency by their construction, we can’t apply the law of large numbers to
Equation (7.2) as is the next step in [48]. The quantity which they obtain
( [48, Equation 4]) is the same as the metric of interest in [60], the informa-
tion density. This work was previously outlined as a future research avenue




and measures the amount of independence between the variables. The ex-
pectation of Equation (7.3) gives the mutual information. The problem of
bounding the eavesdroppers failure rate is now the case of finding the in-
formation density. If the requirements for a secrecy metric are relaxed, to
consider IID codewords, the problem of finding a bound is more tractable. In
the interim, results for non-optimal decoders could be compared to provide
insight to the general case.
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